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ABSTRACT
The objective of this PhD work is provide a flatness based active fault tole-
rant control technique. For such systems, it is possible to find a set of variables,
named flat outputs such that states and control inputs can be expressed as func-
tions of flat outputs and their time derivatives. The fault detection and isolation
block has to provide a fast and accurate fault isolation, this action is carried out
by exploiting the non-uniqueness property of the flat outputs, in fact if a second
set of flat outputs algebraically independent and differentially coupled of the first
are found, the number of residues augments. By consequence this could help to
isolate more faults than if only one set is found.
Regarding reconfiguration if the flat system counts with the properties listed
above we will obtain versions of states and control inputs as much of flat outputs
vector are found, because each control input and state is function of the flat output.
The proposed approach provides in this manner one measure related to a faulty
flat output vector and one or more computed by using and unfaulty one.
The redundant state signals could be use as reference of the controller in
order to hide the fault effect. This will be helpful to provide an entirely flatness-
based fault tolerant control strategy.
The works presented in this manuscript are under the next hypothesis:
The flat outputs are always states of the system or a linear combination of
them.
XI
ABSTRACT XII
The control loop is closed with a state feedback controller.
The states included in the flat output vector are measured or at least esti-
mated.
Faults affecting the actuators are considered rejected by the controller, by
consequence reconfiguration is only carried out after sensor faults.
Since a flat system could be linear or nonlinear, the proposed approach could be
applied in either of two type of systems. Feasibility of this approach is analyzed in
two nonlinear plants, an unmanned quadrotor and a three tank system.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, demographic explosion and globalization, unchained the
necessity to design and operate profitable productions process and reliable trans-
port systems. The presence of a fault in a production process can lead to substan-
tial loss, not only in the manufactured product, but in the production equipment
itself. In some systems, the fault occurrence is even more critical, for example if
an airplane flying at cruising attitude (35000 ft.) is affected by a fault, the conse-
quences of it can lead the airplane to destruction and by consequence the lost
of human lives. Nowadays airplanes count with a surveillance stage, which is in
charge of monitor the entire system and assure the safety of the vehicle. In order
to accomplish such task, manufacturers use physical redundancy, meaning that
two or more subsystems (e.g. flight-control computers, sensors) work in the same
time, this action permits to be robust again a simple fault and guarantees a failure
rate lower than 10−9 failure per flight hour. This solution is easy to implement but
represents a high cost due to the necessity to triple or quadruple the elements.
In complex systems (e.g. Nuclear plants, Petrochemical process, airplanes),
every single component has been designed to accomplish a particular task, in
order to permit the global operation of the system. Thus, a failure appearing in
actuators, sensors or the system itself may affect the nominal performance. The
classical control techniques assure the system stability in closed loop and the
nominal performance desired if no-fault is present. However in a faulty case a
classic closed loop may result in a low performance or system instability and by
consequently the possible system destruction.
XIII
GENERAL INTRODUCTION XIV
In order to avoid system lost, researchers developed control systems capa-
ble of self-repair, meaning that, the controller assure at least system stability and
at the best nominal behavior despite the apparition of a fault. Systems present-
ing this capability are known as Fault Tolerant Control Systems (FTC). Nowadays
fault reconfiguration make an essential part of almost every controlled system.
FTC systems are designed to behave as a classical control system until a fault
affects the controlled plant. If the plant is affected by a fault, the FTC system has
to be capable of detect, identify and reject it as soon as possible. Such actions
have as final objective preserve as the best nominal behavior and at least stability.
During all the long of this manuscript a fault is defined as in the book Fault-
diagnois systems published by Rolf Isermann, [34]. Such publication defines the
fault as “an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property of the
system from the acceptable, usual, standard condition”. Two different types of
faults are considered, additive and multiplicative. The first one is represented by
the addition of a term in the measure or in the control input according to the
current case, see equation (1a). Multiplicative faults are represented by a term
which multiplies the measure or the input according to the affected variable. See
equation (1b).
Y (t) = U(t) + f(t) (1a)
Y (t) = (A+ f(t))(U(t)) (1b)
Where Y (t) represents the output of the sensor or the actuator, U(t) stands for
the sensor or actuator input signal. f(t) represents the fault. A denotes a mul-
tiplicative factor which is usually equal to one. Fig. 1 shows the block diagrams
corresponding to each kind of fault.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION XV
f(t) = ∆Y (t)
U(t) Y (t) = U(t) + f(t)
(a)
U(t) Y (t) = (A + f(t))(U(t))
(b)
f(t) = ∆A(t)
A
Figure 1: (a) Additive fault; (b) Multiplicative fault
In order to counteract the fault, two different strategies could be used, pas-
sive and active, the first strategy comes from the group of robust control. [3]. The
active approaches are characterized by the presence of a Fault Detection and
Isolation (FDI) module, which in function of the fault send information to the re-
configuration block in order to adapt the system to counteract the fault effect. See
section 1.4.1 for more details.
The works presented in this manuscript fit into the framework of active meth-
ods. The proposed approach use the properties of the differentially flat systems to
generate analytical redundancy, such redundancy can be use to generate resid-
ual signals. The main characteristic of the proposed approach is the fact that the
FDI module is coupled with the reconfiguration block, this action could reduce the
computational charge by minimizing the reaction time to counteract the fault. Be-
sides, because the approach is based on the properties of the differentially flat
systems it could be applied to linear and nonlinear systems indistinctly. This work
is devoted to investigate feasibility on nonlinear systems.
The manuscript is divided in three chapters:
The chapter number 1 is devoted to present the properties and the definition
of the flat systems, the flatness-based motion planning is presented as well. A
state of the art of the technique of Fault detection isolation and reconfiguration is
developed as well.
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The chapter number 2 presents the proposed approach. In first time a state
of the art in flatness-based FTC approaches presented in the literature is com-
mented. The algorithm to compute the flat output is presented. In order to facil-
itate the comprehension and highlight the advantages of the technique the fault
tolerant control technique is divided in the fault detection and isolation task and
the reconfiguration block. Both activities are divided in two cases, in order to show
that if a flat system has at least two different set of flat outputs the FTC method is
improved.
The chapter number 3 is dedicated to show the applicability of the FTC
method. Two systems are taken into account, the first one is a UAV quadrotor,
this system only count with a set of flat outputs, however partial reconfiguration
could be applied. In a second time the technique is applied in a classical three
tank system, such plant in contrast to the UAV present two set of flat outputs, this
feature is exploited to full-reconfigure the system after fault.
CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTALS
Abstract:
The goal of this chapter is to present the basic concepts of the
main parts of this research work. The properties of the so-called
differential flatness systems are presented. Flatness-based mo-
tion planning is presented as well. The definition of the Fault To-
lerant Control systems is developed in section 1.4. Sections 1.5
and 1.6 are devoted to present the model-based Fault detection
and Isolation techniques and the existent fault reconfiguration
techniques.
1
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
The appearance of a fault in a system affects directly its performance, by
consequence this will impact the final objective of the system e.g., final position of
a control surface in a plane, water level in a tank, etc. The classical control laws
are designed to ensure stability and nominal performance of the system. How-
ever a classic controller don’t take into account the apparition of faults affecting
sensors, actuators or the system itself, such appearance will affects the nominal
performance in the best of cases, and in the worst one the system will lost not
only performance but even stability. Such behavior should be avoided, especially
in critical systems, for instance nuclear plants or airplanes.
Control systems that take into account such scenario are known as Fault
Tolerant Control Systems (FTC). Those systems can globally be divided in two
main tasks: Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) and Control Reconfiguration.
This chapter is devoted to present such control systems and some tech-
niques of fault detection and fault recovery. Regarding FDI, special attention is
dedicated to model-based approaches [18] whose fault detection principle is based
in the comparison between sensor measures and the measure estimation coming
from a mathematical model describing the physical process. For fault recovery,
the research is focused in control reconfiguration [47].
The main contribution of this thesis is based on the properties of the so-
called differentially flat systems [23]. The next section presents the definition of
those particular systems, as well as the flatness-based motion planning approach.
Which, is facilitated thanks to the inherent properties of the flat systems. Section
1.4 presents the different approaches presented in the literature for FTC systems,
main attention is focused on active systems, which reacts after a fault occurrence,
in order to prevent system loss.
CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS 3
Section 1.5 is devoted to FDI systems and particularly for quantitative model-
based methods. A general outlook of these methods is presented as well. A non-
exhaustive list of fault recovery methods is presented in section 1.6.
1.2 DIFFERENTIALLY FLAT SYSTEMS
The flatness theory search to determine if a system of differential equations
could be parametrized by arbitrary functions. The first works have been carried
out in [10], aiming aeronautical applications. The theory development continued
in the Phd dissertation of P. Martin [50], this work has lead to the formal concept
of flatness presented by M. Fliess et al. in [23].
The differential flatness of non-linear and linear systems, could be described
by using mathematical formalisms, and specifically differential algebra or differen-
tial geometry.
1.2.1 FLATNESS CONCEPT
A non-linear or linear system is flat if there exists a set of variables differen-
tially independents, called flat outputs, whose number is equal to the quantity of
control inputs, such as, the vector state and the control inputs can be expressed
as functions of the flat outputs and a finite number of its time derivatives. By con-
sequence, state and control inputs trajectories can be obtained by planning only
the flat output trajectories, this property can be particularly exploited on trajectory
planning, see [44,45,57,73] and trajectory tracking [2,71]. Flatness could be used
to design robust controllers, see for instance tesis de loic y franck
Definition 1.1 Flat system:
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Let us consider the nonlinear system x˙ = f(x, u), x ∈ <n the state vector, u ∈ <m
the control vector and f a C∞ function of x and u. The system is differentially flat
if, and only if, it exists a flat output vector z ∈ <m such as:
The flat output vector its expressed as function of the state x and the control
input u and a finite number of its time derivatives.
z = φz(x, u, u˙, ..., u
(γ)) (1.1)
The state x and the control input u are expressed as functions of the vector
z and a finite number of its time derivatives.
x = φx(z, z˙, ..., z
(α)) (1.2)
u = φu(z, z˙, ..., z
(α+1)) (1.3)
Where z(α) denotes the αth time derivative of z.
Every flat system is equivalent to a linear controllable one by diffeomorphism
and endogenous dynamic feedback, moreover, the flat outputs are the solutions
of the system of differential equations which determines the diffeomorphism and
the feedback linearizable, by consequence, every controllable linear system is flat,
and conversely. Moreover regarding observability a flat system is always obser-
vable from the flat outputs.
1.2.2 FLAT SYSTEMS EXAMPLES
This section presents various examples of flat systems. Additional examples
can be found in [40].
Example 1.2 Planar ducted fan [73]:
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Figure 1.1: Planar ducted fan [73]
The system is mounted on a rotating arm that moves in as the fan moves up. [36],
see Fig. 1.1 neglecting some dynamics the nonlinear model obtained is:

mxx˙
my y˙
Jθ˙

 =


cosθ −sinθ
sinθ cosθ
r 0



 u1
u2 +mgg

+


0
−mgg
0

 (1.4)
Where (x and y) are the coordinates of the center of mass, θ is the angle
with the vertical axis, u1 is the force perpendicular to the fan shroud, r is the
distance between the center of mass and the point where the force is applied, g is
the gravitational constant, mx and my are the inertial mass of the fan in the (x, y)
direction respectively, mgg is the weight of the fan, and J is the moment of inertia.
The tracking outputs are the (x, y) coordinates of the center of mass.
The flat outputs are:
z1 = x− J
mxr
sinθ (1.5)
z2 = y − J
myr
cosθ (1.6)
The angle θ can be expressed in function of the flat outputs:
θ =
−mxz¨1
myz¨2 +mgg
(1.7)
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Using the equations above is straightforward to found the expressions of
the states. Interested reader could found calculation details in [17] and [51]. After
obtaining the necessary time derivatives, each control input could be expressed
as function of the flat outputs.
u1 =
Jθ¨
r
(1.8)
u2 =
cosθu1 −mxx¨− sinθmgg
sinθ
(1.9)
Figure 1.2: Non holonomic car [40]
Example 1.3 Non holonomic car [40]:
Consider a vehicle of four wheels rolling without slipping on the horizontal plane.
We denote by (x, y) the coordinates of the point P , middle of the rear axle, Q
the middle point of the front axis, θ the angle between the longitudinal axis of
the vehicle and the Ox axis. The system counts with two control inputs u which
denotes the vertical thrust and ϕ the angle of the front wheels. See Fig. 1.2.
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The mathematical model of the vehicle can be expressed as follows:
x˙ = ucosθ
y˙ = usinθ
θ˙ =
u
l
tanϕ
(1.10)
This system has two control inputs, by definition the flat output vector is
compound of two elements. Let us prove that z = [x, y]T .
Combining the two first equations of (1.10) we can obtain:
θ = tan−1
(
z˙2
z˙1
)
u =
√
z˙1
2 + z˙2
2
(1.11)
The expression of θ˙ could be found by computing the time derivative of the
first equation in (2.14). Such computation leads to:
θ˙ =
z¨2z˙1 − z˙2z¨1
z˙1
2 + z˙2
2 (1.12)
From the third equation of (1.10) we can compute
ϕ = tan−1
(
lθ˙
u
)
= tan−1
(
(l(z¨2z˙1 − z˙2z¨1)
(z˙1
2 + z˙2
2)
3
2
)
(1.13)
Equations (2.14,2.15,1.13), demonstrate that the non holonomic car de-
scribed by the equations (1.10) is flat.
1.3 MOTION PLANNING
The goal of motion planning is to find control actions that moves the con-
cerned system from a start state to a goal condition, while respecting constraints
and avoiding collision.
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Motion planning for manipulators robots have attracted research interest in
the beginnings of the 90’s, see [46] for instance. More recently special attention
is devoted to vehicle motion planning, which is a special case, such increases in
solving difficulty when the degrees of freedom (DOF) augments. See for instance
[29] and references therein for an extensive planning algorithms survey for UAV’s.
This section is focused in the flatness-based motion planning approach.
1.3.1 TERMINOLOGY
The terminology [38] used in this work is the next:
Path planning: A geometric representation to move from an initial to a final
condition. The main goal is to find a collision-free path among a collection of
static and dynamic obstacles.
Trajectory planning: also known as trajectory generation. It includes ve-
locities, accelerations, and jerks along the path. Normally the main task is
to find trajectories for a priori specified paths. Those trajectories could be
obliged to fulfill a certain criterion (eg., minimum execution time, minimum
energy consumption).
Motion planning: Is the union of path and trajectory planning.
1.3.2 FLATNESS-BASED MOTION PLANNING
As defined in the subsection 1.3.1 the motion planning goal is computing a
trajectory that satisfies certain path constraints.
Let us define a non linear system x˙ = f(x, u). The motion planning consists
in fulfill initial and final conditions [40]:
x(ti) = xi, u(ti) = ui
x(tf ) = xf , u(tf) = uf
(1.14)
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Once the path defined, the trajectory generation problem consists in finding a
trajectory t 7→ (x(t), u(t)) for t ∈ [ti, tf ] that satisfies the system constraints and the
initial and final conditions (1.14). Trajectory constraints of type (x(t), u(t)) ∈ A(t),
where A(t) is a submanifold of X×U could be added to the motion planning initial
problem. This results in a growing complexity that requires an iterative solution
by numerical methods to find the control input u that satisfies the initial and final
conditions (1.14). This iterative process can be solved by using optimal control
techniques, however for nonlinear systems some problems still unsolved. Besides
this solution needs to integrate the system equations in order to evaluate the
solution proposed.
Motion planning by flatness, does not need to integrate the system equations
and for a flat output trajectory, command inputs can be computed directly, the
u vector resultant always respect the system dynamics, see equation (1.3). By
consequence the solutions of the set of differential equations are found. See [44,
59].
Definition 1.1 implies that every system variable can be expressed in terms
of the flat outputs and a finite number of its time derivatives. By consequence if
we want to compute a trajectory whose initial and final conditions are specified, it
suffices to construct a flat output trajectory to obtain the open loop control inputs
satisfying the system output desired.
In order to compute all the system variables, the flat output trajectory created
needs to be at least r times differentiable, where r is the maximal time derivative
of the flat output appearing in the differential flat equations. Additionally this tra-
jectory is not required to satisfy any differential equation. By consequence the flat
outputs trajectories can be created by using a simple polynomial approach. See
Appendix A for further details.
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If the trajectories needs to be optimal in some sense, a more advanced
trajectory generation technique has to be used, some application examples can
be found in [8,44,45,73].
Let us retake the example 1.2.2 in order to create nominal trajectories for the
state θ and the two control inputs u and ϕ, the desired value for the x and y position
is the same and its equal to five, see Fig. 1.3. After computing the time derivatives
of such trajectories and using the expression of the equations 2.14, 2.15 and 1.13
it is straightforward to obtain the nominal trajectory for the remaining state and the
control inputs. See Figs. 1.3 and 1.4. The fact that obtaining the control inputs is
especially helpful to control the system in open loop.
0 50 100 1500
5
Time [s]
x 
0 50 100 1500
5
Time [s]
y
0 50 100 150−2
0
2
Time [s]
θ
Figure 1.3: Flat outputs and states
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0 50 100 1500
0.05
0.1
Time [s]
u
0 50 100 1500
1
2
3
4 x 10
−5
Time [s]
φ
Figure 1.4: Control inputs
1.4 FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL
Industrial and transport systems have become a complex network com-
posed of processors, interfaces, actuators and sensors which may suffer mal-
functions. This phenomena could compromise the entire system if a fault occurs.
A fault tolerant control (FTC) is designed keeping in mind such potential system
components failures, and avoids system loss which can affect productivity or safe-
ty as a result.
FTC is divided in two different approaches:
Passive: Known as robust control, here, the control law is designed to be
insensitive to some faults. This approach has limited fault-tolerant capabili-
ties and it is beyond the scope of this work, interested readers are referred
to [84] and references therein.
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Active: In this approach, the control system is reconfigured using the infor-
mation coming from the detection block, having as goal to maintain at least
system stability and at the best the nominal behavior. See [58,65].
This research work is focused on Active Fault Tolerant Control approach.
1.4.1 ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEMS (AFTCS)
Active approaches consists of adjusting the controller on-line, according to
the detected fault, having as goal the preservation of the faulty system perfor-
mance close to the nominal one, to this a fault recovery task is needed.
For critical failures as an actuator lost for instance, the nominal behavior
cannot be maintained, thus, the system performance is reduced as shown in Fig.
1.5. FTC objective is to reconfigure the controller as fast as possible in order
to maintain the nominal performance. Moreover, not all faults are reconfigurable,
thus is it impossible to keep the system operating even in a degraded mode. In
this case FTC function is to shut down the systems safely.
By this way three activities must be covered by the FTC system, [65]:
Deal with various kinds of faults (sensor, actuators, system itself).
Provide information about the fault and the reachable performance.
Decide if the system can still operating or not.
AFTCS overall structure is typically composed by four sub-systems, [83]. see
Fig. 1.6.
A reconfigurable feedforward/feedback controller, which can react to the fail-
ure by changing some controller parameters or the entire closed loop.
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Figure 1.5: FTC Strategies [65]
A Fault detection and identification (FDI) block, this block has to perform a
fast and accurate failure recognition.
A controller reconfiguration mechanism, which is in charge of link the fault
identification mechanism and the reconfigurable controller.
A trajectory planner/re-planner designed to avoid actuator saturation and
adjust the reference trajectory after failure.
Thanks to its versatility, differential flatness can be used to create a com-
pletely FTC structure. In fact since its formulation in 1992, flatness has been wide-
ly used to design controllers, see [32,51,60,68,81] for some examples. Regarding
fault detection and identification some works has been presented too, [43,54,61].
The second of them is issued from the works of this dissertation. Motion plan-
ning/replanning can be afforded using flatness, see [8, 9, 45] for some examples.
Control reconfiguration has been studied as well. [49, 53, 55, 72]. More details of
the FDI and FTC approaches will be presented in the next chapter.
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1.5 FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION (FDI)
This stage can be divided in two essential tasks [18]:
Fault detection: in charge of detect the non-expected behavior of the system.
Fault isolation: localize the faulty system element.
A third activity can be added. Which consists in determine the amplitude of the
fault. Along with control reconfiguration FDI block play an important role inside
AFTCS. According to [77], FDI methods can be divided in two different groups,
see Fig. 1.7:
Model-based Methods:
• Quantitative methods: Based on mathematical functional expressing
relationships between inputs and outputs of the system, [77].
• Qualitative methods: Based on qualitative functions expressing the re-
lationships between inputs and outputs, [75].
CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS 15
Process history based: Based on the availability of large amount of historical
process, [76].
FDI METHODS
Observers
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Figure 1.7: FDI Methods [83]
In order to isolate the fault, the three approaches presented below need
some a priori knowledge, this is, the set of faults and their relationship with the
residues. This information is normally sorted in form of a table. Qualitative model-
based and process histories are outside of the boundaries of this thesis, interested
reader could find a review of them in [75] and [76] respectively.
1.5.1 QUANTITATIVE MODEL-BASED FDI APPROACH
Quantitative methods need a mathematical model of the system, in order to
compute residual signals, which reflects the faults affecting the system. Then, this
information is introduced into a decision rule. The union of those tasks helps to
obtain information about the fault affecting the plant.
In order to compute the residual signals, redundancy is needed, this could
be obtained through two different approaches:
Hardware Redundancy
Analytical Redundancy
Figure 1.8 shows the differences between these two approaches.
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HARDWARE REDUNDANCY
Also known as physical redundancy, it is extremely used in chemical indus-
tries, aeronautics and industrial processes where persons life are in danger, the
main idea consists in multiply the number of sensors dedicated to perform the
same activity. Those sensors usually are based in different technologies.
For instance three sensors, produces three residues as follows:
r1 = m1 −m2
r2 = m1 −m3
r3 = m2 −m3
(1.15)
A voting mechanism points the faulty sensor by using the table 1.1. In which
the symbol X means that the sensor is fault-free and × means that the sensor
is faulty.
This approach has as advantage an easy design and efficiency. In the other
hand since sensors are multiplied the construction and operation costs are ele-
vated.
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Sensor 1 Sensor 2 Sensor 3 r1 r2 r3
X X X 0 0 0
× X X 6= 0 6= 0 0
X × X 6= 0 0 6= 0
X X × 0 6= 0 6= 0
X × × 6= 0 6= 0 6= 0
× X × 6= 0 6= 0 6= 0
× × X 6= 0 6= 0 6= 0
× × × 6= 0 6= 0 6= 0
Table 1.1: Hardware redundancy FDI logic
ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY
In contrast to physical redundancy, here, the redundant signals are comput-
ed via mathematical equations describing the plant.
Residual signals are constructed by making a comparison between the real
process and the mathematical model, it is straightforward to think that if the sys-
tem is unfaulty, the residual signal will be equals to zero, however if a fault affects
the plant, the resultant residue will be different to zero. This approach is correct if
the mathematical model describes perfectly the process and disturbances are not
present. In practice this behavior is not possible, since model uncertainties are
always present. Moreover residue post-processing is necessary to distinguish the
effects of different faults. After fault generation the principal concern is to obtain
the maximum quantity of fault information from them.
Different quantitative model-based FDI techniques for linear and nonlinear
systems are presented below.
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1.5.1.1 STATE ESTIMATION
The main idea of those techniques is to provide an estimate of the system
state xˆ, from measurements of the control inputs and system measurements. By
this way residual signals for sensor faults can be computed by simply comparing
the actual output and the estimated one. r = y − Cxˆ for linear systems and r =
y −H(xˆ, u) for nonlinear models.
In order to compute the estimated state, different approaches can be used,
here a non-exhaustive list of techniques is shown.
1.5.1.1.1 OBSERVER BASED
The observer-based approaches are the mostly applied model-based resid-
ual generation techniques. This technique is based in the reconstruction of the
outputs of the system, by means of the mathematical model of the plant operating
in nominal mode. It should be noted that there is a difference between observers
used for control purposes and fault detection. The observers needed for control
are state observers, meaning that they estimate states which are not directly mea-
sured, with the goal to use such estimations to control the concerned plant. On
the other hand, the observers needed for fault detection generate estimation of
the measurements, both of them are then compared in order to compute a resid-
ual signal. Any deviation of residual signal from zero will trigger a fault alarm.
However, the presence of modeling uncertainties and disturbances is inevitable.
Therefore, the aim is to design observers such that the effect of the disturbances
and uncertainties on the residual signal is reduced while the affect of faults is
considerably increased.
Consider the nonlinear system described by the equations
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = h(x(t), u(t))
(1.16)
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where x(t) ∈ <n is the state vector, u(t) ∈ <m is the control input, y(t) ∈ <p
is the output of the system.
The observer-based fault diagnosis problem is find a residual generator of
the form:
ξ˙(t) = g(ξ(t), y(t), u(t)), ξ(0) = ξ0
r(t) = R(ξ(t), y(t), u(t))
(1.17)
Over the past, several observer-based approaches have been proposed,
see for example [11, 18, 24] for a survey. Some of them are presented in the next
paragraphs.
NONLINEAR IDENTITY OBSERVER APPROACH (NIO)
Proposed for the first time in [31]. This observer is developed under the
assumption that the model is perfectly known and the system is unfaulty. The
observer structure is the following:
ξ˙(t) = f(ξ, u) +Kobs(ξ, u)[y − yˆ]
r(t) = y − h(ξ, u)
(1.18)
The error estimation can thus be defined by: e(t) = x(t)− ξ(t), its dynamics
can be expressed as follows:
e˙ = F (ξ, u)−Kobs(ξ, u)H(ξ, u)e+HOT
r(t) = H(ξ, u)e+HOT
(1.19)
Where F (ξ, u) = δh((x,u))
δx
|x=ξ and H(ξ, u) = δf((x,u))δx |x=ξ. The High Order
Terms (HOT ) are neglected.
The observer gain Kobs is determined in such a way that the error dynamics
are asymptotically stable e = 0. A solution to this problem was first proposed in [1]
by assuming that the measurements are linear.
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EXTENDED LUENBERGER OBSERVER
The first application of a Luenberger observer was devoted to linear systems
[13]. This approach can directly be applied to nonlinear systems, however if the
system is operating far away from the linearizing point, the linearized system could
deviate largely from the nonlinear model.
The main idea of the extended version of the Luenberger observer is lin-
earize the model around current states estimations (xˆ), instead of a fix point. Once
that a more accurate linearization is computed the observer can be applied. The
observer structure is described by:
ξ˙ = f(ξ, u) + L(ξ, u)(y − C(ξ, u)), ξ(0) = ξ0
yˆ = C(ξ, u)
(1.20)
Where L(ξ, u) is the observer gain, which has to assure that the eigenvalues
of δf(x,u)
δx
− L(ξ, u) δc(x,u)
δx
are stable. Detailed information and FDI application can
be found in [1,80]. The practical application of this approach is not optimal, since
the observer gain has to be computed repetitively, which means an important
computational charge.
SLIDING-MODE OBSERVER
Robustness against disturbances and uncertainties are inherent to this kind
of observers. Those characteristics make them suitable for state estimation and
fault detection. Its design is divided in two stages, first a sliding control surface has
to be constructed and then, a control law is designed, which drives the system
trajectories to the sliding surface in a finite time. This approach have been widely
applied in linear [19,30] and nonlinear systems [78,79].
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1.5.1.2 PARAMETER ESTIMATION
Parameter estimation approaches are based on the assumption that the fault
are reflected in the system parameters. The detection task is accomplished by
comparing the nominal parameters versus the on-line estimation. The main ad-
vantage of this approach is that it yields the size of the parameter deviation which
is important to fault analysis. Parameter estimation is useful for component fault
detection since it verifies directly the discrepancy between internal parameters. A
disadvantage is that an input signal is always needed in order to excite the system
and create signals to estimate the parameters, this action may result in problems
if the system is operating in the stationary mode.
Most of the parameter estimation techniques are based on least squares
(LS), recursive least squares (RLS), extended least squares (ELS), etc.
1.5.1.3 SIMULTANEOUS STATE/PARAMETER ESTIMATION
1.5.1.3.1 EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER
The extended Kalman filter (EKF) have been largely applied to estimate
states and system parameters of discrete systems. Let us consider the discrete
nonlinear system described by:
xk = f(xk−1, uk, vk, θk)
yk = h(xk, wk, θk)
(1.21)
where x ∈ <n the state vector, u ∈ <m the control input vector, y ∈ <p the output
measures, v ∈ <n and w ∈ <p are the state and measure noise respectively and
θ ∈ <q is the vector of parameters.
The main idea of the EKF is linearize the nonlinear functions f and h around
the current state estimation xˆk, and then the Kalman filter is applied.
CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS 22
The Kalman filter is compound by a group of recurrent equations, which are
relatively easy to solve from a numerical point of view. The filter provides the
optimal estimation of the states and the variance of the estimation error.
xk = Akxk−1 +Bkuk +Gkvk
yk = ckxk + Ekwk
(1.22)
where v and w are non-correlated white noises with zero mean.
E[vkv
T
j ] = Qkδkj
E[wkw
T
j ] = Rkδkj
E[wkv
T
j ] = 0 ∀k, j
(1.23)
where Q and R are the variance matrices of the noise, E[.] is the expectation
value of the alleatory variable [.] and δkj = 1, k = j and 0, k 6= j.
The state x and the measure y are deducted from the white noises v and w
and the initial condition x0, with E[x0] = 0. From the initial conditions the covari-
ance matrix P0 = E[x0xT0 ]. The goal is provide an estimation of the state vector
xˆk, by minimizing the variance of the error estimation.
xˆk = argmin
{
[(xk − xˆk)(xk − xˆk)T | y1:k]
} (1.24)
For further details see for example [15,64].
1.5.1.4 PARITY SPACE
The parity space approach first presented in [12], makes use of the parity
check on the consistency of parity equation by using system measures. By this
way the inconsistency in the parity relations indicates the presence of fault. Chow
and Willsky derived the parity relations based on state-space model of the system,
an approach based in transfer functions was developed in [28]. The main idea of
this approach is to eliminate the unknown state and then to obtain relations where
all components are known.
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For nonlinear systems an approach based on the inverse model of input-
output is presented in [37, 62] generalized the parity space approach for linear
systems to nonlinear systems described by Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy models. [39]
presents an extension of the linear parity space approach to nonlinear systems by
preserving the original structure of the polynomial parity vector approach. This ap-
proach allows to generate the maximum number of linearly independent residues
for a system. Detailed information of the method can be found in chapter 2.
1.6 FAULT RECOVERY
After the fault isolation stage, the next step in a FTC system is re-adjust the
control chain of the system, aiming the nominal behavior or at least stability. This
task can be accomplished in two different ways [47,67].
Fault accommodation.
Fault reconfiguration.
Figure 1.9 and the next subsections presents a general overview of both group of
methods.
ACTIV E FAULT RECOV ERY METHODS
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Figure 1.9: Fault recovery methods [47]
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1.6.1 FAULT ACCOMMODATION
Here, the measurements and the signals going into the controller remain
unchanged, the fault recovery is carried out by changing the controller internals
(dynamic order, parameters, gain values etc.), [58]. One example of this technique
is the adaptive controller technique, where the controller is tuned to minimize the
distance between nominal closed loop and the actual behavior, [4].
Adaptive controller can be divided in two approaches: direct and indirect, in
the first one the controller parameters are directly tuned, the second is performed
in two steps, first, the mathematical model of the plant is estimated and then a
controller for this plant is computed. This approach presents some limitations, for
example, if an abrupt fault affects the system, the needed time to compute all
the controllers parameters could be important. By consequence the system could
become unstable before finishing the compute. The same case is worst with the
second approach, since more time is needed to carried out the two steps. Besides,
the fault can lead the system outside the linearization zone and by consequence
linearize the system becomes impossible. Structural damage is not covered.
1.6.2 FAULT RECONFIGURATION
In fault reconfiguration techniques controller parameters and input-output
signals are manipulated. By this way those techniques carry out fault recovery
not only reconfiguring the controller but also including dynamic signal re-routing
of measures.
Reconfiguration methods are divided in four different groups, [47]:
Projection.
Controller redesign.
Fault hiding.
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Learning control.
1.6.2.1 PROJECTION
Methods inside this classification are always based in the off-line design of
certain components. Those elements are arranged in banks. Depending on the
fault that want to be reconfigured, two banks can be used, see Fig. 1.10:
1.6.2.1.1 BANK OF OBSERVERS
Observers banks can only handle sensor faults, each observer uses the in-
formation of all sensors but one. This measure is considered hypothetically faulty.
Using all inputs and all outputs except the one considered faulty, each observer
can compute an estimation of every system state, and thus estimate the plant out-
put yˆ. Residues are obtained by computing the difference between the measure
y and the estimation yˆ. The residue with the smallest error represents the current
fault case, [25]. Reconfiguration is achieved by feeding the nominal controller with
the current fault case. The main advantage of this technique is that it handle the
reconfiguration in an integrated manner, which by consequence can reduce the
computing time.
1.6.2.1.2 BANK OF CONTROLLERS
Sensors, actuators and system faults can be covered with this technique.
The FDI is carried out by a diagnostic algorithm. The fault information coming
from this block is then used to select the most appropriate of the a priori designed
controllers. Since, the number of controllers designed must be equal to the num-
ber of managed failures the off-line effort can be important.
CHAPTER 1. FUNDAMENTALS 26
Actuators
System
Dynamics Sensors
Sensor
Faults
Actuators
System
Dynamics Sensors
Actuator
Faults
Sensor
Faults
System
Faults
Observer 1
Observer 2
Observer n
....
Residual
evaluation
Residues
K
y
yˆ
u
Fault
Diagnosis
K
K
K
y
u
Figure 1.10: Banks of observers and controllers [47]
1.6.2.2 CONTROLLER REDESIGN
This approach perform in real time a completely redesign of the controller in
order to recover the faulty system. This action is carried out in explicit or implicit
way, in the first, the difference between the outputs of the reconfigured plant and
the reference model is minimized. In the implicit way, quadratic functions of the
actual and modeled states are minimized. Computational cost varies from one
method to another. The goal of the control reconfiguration is to minimize the dis-
tance between a nominal unfaulty model and the faulty system. This problem is
known as model matching. Mathematically, this idea can be expressed as follows:
Let us define a linear system:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Bddx(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + dy
(1.25)
Where x(t) ∈ <n is the system state, y(t) ∈ <p is the output, u(t) ∈ <m the
control input, Bd the disturbance distribution matrix, dx and dy are the state and
measurements disturbance respectively.
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In presence of faults the system (1.25) becomes:
x˙f (t) = Afxf (t) +Bfuf(t) +Bddx(t)
y(t) = Cfxf (t) + dy
(1.26)
The idea of model matching is define a reference model compound by the
system (1.26) and the state feedback controller:
u(t) = Kx(t) +Gw(t) (1.27)
Where K is the static controller feedback matrix, G is the reference pre-filter,
w(t) the reference input. The reference model is expressed as follows:
x˙(t) =Mx(t) +Nw(t)
y = P ∗x
(1.28)
In transfer function form, the reference model is:
T (s) = P ∗ (sI −M)−1N (1.29)
Where M = A − BK and N = BG. M,N and P ∗ are selected by the designer.
Thus the model matching problem consist in determine a new feedback controller:
u(t) = Kfx(t) +Gfw(t) (1.30)
such that:
Af − BfKf −M = 0
BfGf −N = 0
(1.31)
Various approaches have been developed to solve this problem.
1.6.2.2.1 PSEUDO-INVERSE METHODS
This method was the first one to treat this problem [5]. It is addressed to
actuators and fault systems. Here the model matching problem presented above
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is solved by minimizing the distance between the closed loop matrices according
to the 2-norm ‖ . ‖2. Two criteria are minimized:
J1 =‖M − (Af − BfKf ) ‖2
J2 =‖ N −BfGf ‖2
(1.32)
The optimal solution can be computed by using:
K∗f = argminJ1 = B
+
f (Af −M)
G∗f = argminJ2 = B
+
f N
(1.33)
Where B+f denotes the pseudo-inverse of Bf . The optimal solution obtained(
K∗f , G
∗
f
)
is plugged into the loop instead of the nominal controller, see Fig1.11.
This method does not guarantee the stability of the reconfigured system because
the optimisation problem is unconstrained. In order to ensure system stability Gao
and Antsaklis presented a modified pseudo-inverse method (MPIM) [26]. Here
the unconstrained stability problem become a constrained one, it is formulated in
terms of the stability robustness of linear systems with structured uncertainty. The
stability problem is solved, however the high computational charge prevents its
application in real time. In [69] Staroswiecki presented a computationally simpler
approach based on a set of admissible models. The admissible model is chosen
in such a way that the system robust stability is assured. This technique is known
as Admissible pseudo-inverse method (APIM).
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Figure 1.11: Pseudo-inverse Method [47]
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1.6.2.2.2 MODEL FOLLOWING
PERFECT MODEL FOLLOWING
This idea was presented in [27]. Here the model matching problem is solved
by combining the use of a stabilizing feedback and a dynamic compensator in
order to match exactly the dynamic behavior.
A closed loop linear system satisfies perfect model following with respect to
the reference model (1.28) if and only if:
A +BK =M
G = N
(1.34)
Figure 1.12 shows the typical structure. The reference model is running in
parallel with the plant and it is implemented in the controller. By this way the control
input is:
u(t) = Kee(t) + (Kmxm(t) +Kww(t)) (1.35)
With Ke the stabilizing gain and Km, Kw the model matching gains. e(t) is
defined as the difference between the state variables of the plant and the refer-
ence model, to achieve perfect model matching this error has to be equal to zero
for all t > 0.
The model matching gains are determined to minimize:
‖ (M −Af )x(t) +Nw(t)−Bfu(t) ‖2=‖ e˙(t)− (Af − BfKe)e(t) ‖2 (1.36)
Where the error dynamics is expressed by:
e˙(t)Afe(t) + (M − Af)xm(t) +Nw(t)−Bfu(t) (1.37)
The solution of the equation (1.36) is given by:
Km = B
+
f (M − Af )
Kw = B
+
f N
(1.38)
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This technique guarantees closed loop stability if the terms (Af ,Bf ) are sta-
bilisable.
1.6.2.2.3 OPTIMISATION
LQ REDESIGN
This technique was presented in [42].The main idea of this technique is de-
sign a LQ-optimal nominal controller. After FDI a new LQ controller is designed
online, using the faulty plant model. If the faulty plant still controllable the LQ al-
gorithm will find a new LQ-optimal controller.
MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL (MPC)
The main idea of the MPC technique is divided in three main steps, first
a prediction of the future behavior of the process state/output is accomplished.
Second, the future input signals are computed online at each step by minimizing a
cost function under inequality constraints on the manipulated (control) and/or con-
trolled variables. Finally, apply on the controlled plant only the first of vector control
variable and repeat the previous step with new measured input/state/output vari-
ables.
To achieve control reconfiguration, it is necessary to update the internal plant
model of the MPC controller. The MPC controller will find the optimal sequence
using the update plant model. Since the computational charge is important, this
technique is applied principally in slow dynamics systems.
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Figure 1.12: Model Following schema [47]
1.6.2.3 FAULT-HIDING
The main idea of these approaches is to keep the nominal controller during
a fault occurrence. Fault recovery is then carried out by adding a reconfigura-
tion block between the controller and the faulty plant. This block is designed in
a manner that the faulty plant mimics the behavior of the unfaulty system. This
behavior is obtained by means of two blocks, a virtual sensor and a virtual actu-
ator Fig. 1.13. A virtual sensor consists in a model of the faulty plant and a gain
L, this block is in charge of provide estimates of the system states xˆ. The virtual
actuator is compound of a reference model, as well as feedback of the difference
between the state of the reference model and two matrix M and N , which have to
be chosen in such a way that the virtual actuator state is stable and the difference
between the nominal output and the real one equals to 0.
By this way sensor and actuator faults can be handle, this approach can be
applied to linear [47] and nonlinear [66] systems.
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Figure 1.13: Fault-hiding approach [47]
1.6.2.4 LEARNING CONTROL
This approach is based in the idea of mix classical control techniques with
learning control methods (Neural networks, expert systems, etc.). By this way a
database of performance measures is constructed and a decision making unit
decides how to face the fault, [70].
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1.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter presented an overview of some model-based FDI techniques
and fault reconfiguration approaches. The concept of differentially flat systems are
presented as well. Flat systems property possess an inherent capability of gener-
ate analytical redundancy, this property can be exploited to create FDI schemes.
The two final sections were devoted to present the existent FDI and FTC tech-
niques presented currently in the literature.
In the next chapter the FTC flatness-based proposed approach is detailed.
This approach differs from the presented here in the fact that both, FDI and fault
recovery are carried out by exploiting the inherent properties of the flat systems.
CHAPTER 2
FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL: A
FLATNESS-BASED APPROACH
Abstract:
In this chapter the proposed FTC approach is presented. It is
based in the fact that the set of flat outputs is not unique, in fact if
a second set of flat outputs algebraically independent of the first
one is found, this will provide redundancy, which, will increase the
number of residues, facilitating in this manner the fault detection.
Additionally the redundant signals will be used to reconfigure the
system after fault.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the proposed approach of this research work.
Chapter 2 is divided in two main parts, in the first one a state of the art of the
FDI/FTC flatness-based techniques is presented, together with the mathematical
theory that helps to found the flat outputs. The necessary conditions to use the
proposed approach are defined as well. In the second part of the section, the
FTC flatness-based approach is presented, firstly the attention is only focus in the
FDI technique and then using the inherent characteristics of the flat systems, the
FDI technique is extended to reconfigure the faulty system. By this way the fault
detection and fault reconfiguration tasks are done in an integrated manner.
In order to verify the behavior of the system and decide if a fault is present or
not, it becomes necessary to generate residual signals. The proposed approach
use parity equations to generate them. Thanks to its inherent properties differen-
tial flatness can be used to generate redundancy in a natural way, this property
will be exploited to generate parity equations, those equations are a comparison
between the behavior of the system and the behavior of a flat model of the fault-
free case, the resultant will be the residual signal, which, will be different of zero
in presence of a fault and close to zero in the fault-free case.
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The differential flatness property is already proven for many systems [40,
52], however nowadays we cannot find an effective and systematic algorithm to
compute the flat outputs. In fact founding a set of flat outputs is more related
to the experience and sometimes the knowledge of the system because the flat
outputs could be a certain physical meaning. Which is already established are
the necessary and sufficient conditions for differential flatness, those conditions
were presented by Jean Lévine in [41] , this work inspire the FTC based approach
presented in this work. This method will be presented in section 2.4. The next two
sections are consecrated to present the sate of the art of FDI/FTC flatnes-based
approaches.
2.2 FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION BY FLATNESS
Since the first publication of flat systems theory in the early 90’s, they have
been attracted much attention in different automatic control areas, such as con-
troller design [32, 51, 60, 68, 81] and motion planning [8, 9]. However regarding
FDI/FTC not many works are published. See for instance [35, 43, 49, 61, 72, 82].
The main property of the flat systems provide analytical redundancy, since, every
control input and system state can be expressed as function of flat outputs, see
definition 1.1. By this way parity equation could be computed by simply comparing
measures versus estimations. The result of such parity equations are known as
residual signals, as always if its amplitude is close to zero the system is working
normally, if not, the system is consider faulty. Almost all the approaches presented
in the literature take advantage of this property.
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In [61] differential flatness is coupled with a nonlinear observer, in order to
construct the residual signals, see Fig. 2.1. The nonlinear observer is in charge
of create an estimation of the control inputs. Such estimation can now be directly
compared to the estimation of the same variables but this time obtained with the
differentially flat equations. The main problem of this technique lies in the fact that
the residuals are obtained by comparing two different approaches, since both of
them could differ in some aspects, for instance dynamic speed, this could create
some false alarms because the phase difference of both signals.
Inputs Actuators
Dynamic
System
Dynamics
Differentially
F lat equations
Observer
FDI
Algorithm
Decision
Figure 2.1: FDI flatness-based schema with observer, [61]
The flatness-based FDI approach presented in [48, 49], use an algebraic
approach [21,22,56] to estimate actuator faults. Such estimations help to identify
the fault. This work takes into account only additive faults. The fact that the fault is
estimated will be specially useful to reject the fault.
The analytical redundancy obtained thanks to the main property of the dif-
ferentially flat systems is exploited to generate residual signals in [72]. The time
derivatives of the flat output are computed by using B-splines. For this work the
fault amplitude is estimated and this information is used to compensate the fault.
This approach is applied to linear systems.
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In [43] and [82] the residuals are computed by comparing the state estima-
tion to the state measure, in order to overcome noise and modeling errors and
improve the effectiveness of the threshold-based fault detection scheme, a prob-
abilistic distribution is generated. This approach is applied to discrete nonlinear
flat systems. The main problem of this approach is the fact that create an online
probabilistic distribution is a hard task, the response of the authors was coupled
a simplified pre-computed distribution with a neuro-fuzzy logic, which reduce the
computational charge but increase the designing work. Those approaches are
applied to discrete nonlinear flat systems.
In [35] the residual signals are computed by using the estimation of deriva-
tives obtained with the algebraic approach presented in [21,22,56]. Besides fault
indicators are robust with respect to uncertain parameters in the controlled plant.
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the FDI techniques found on the literature.
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Reference Applied in Handling faults Fault type Advantages/ Inconvenients
[61] Nonlinear Sensors Multiplicative
Relatively easy design.
Difference between dynamics
could create false alarms.
[48,49]
Linear
Actuators Additive
Estimate the fault amplitude.
Nonlinear Only additive faults are taken
into account.
[72] Linear Sensors Additive
Estimate the fault amplitude.
Only additive faults are taken
into account.
[43,82] Discrete nonlinear System Additive Could facilitate the real time application.
Hard design work.
[35] Nonlinear Actuators Additive Estimate the fault amplitude.
Could be computational expensive.
Table 2.1: FDI by flatness
CHAPTER 2. FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL: A FLATNESS-BASED APPROACH 40
2.3 FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL BY FLATNESS
Recovery after fault is carried out using the estimation of the faults. In fact
for instance [72], estimates the fault amplitude by adding the nominal value to
the estimated, see Fig. 2.2. Then the signal is conditioned using the B-spline,
the obtained trajectory is added to the measure of the faulty sensor. Only faults
affecting sensor are taken into account, the approach is applied to linear systems,
focus on sensor faults.
As in the reference above in [49] the fault is estimated and then such in-
formation helps to recover the system from a faulty position. The main difference
lies in the fact that this time the fault is estimated by using the algebraic approach
and not B-splines. The approach is intended to actuator faults. According to the
authors additive and multiplicative could be treated indistinctly.
The main disadvantage of both techniques is the fact that estimation plus
signal conditioning could take some time to be accomplished, such time delay
could lead the system to instability.
Actuators
System
Dynamics
Residual
Computation
Sensors
Feedback
Controller
Threshold
and signal
conditionning
+
Figure 2.2: FDI flatness-based FTC schema, [72]
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2.4 ON THE FORMAL CALCULUS OF FLAT OUTPUTS
More details of the theory presented in this section can be found in [41].
Let us consider a nonlinear system in its implicit form (where the input vari-
ables are eliminated).
F (x, x˙) = 0 (2.1)
An implicit system is defined as (X, τX, F ), with X = X × Rn∞, dimX = n, τX the
trivial Cartan field on X, and rank δF
δx˙
= n − m, this system will be Lie-Bäcklund
equivalent to the implicit system (N, τN, G), with N = Y × Rp∞, dimY = p, τN the
trivial Cartan field on N, and rank δG
δy˙
= p − q if and only if it exists a locally C∞
mapping Φ : N 7→ X, with locally C∞ inverse Ψ. This implies that:
Φ∗τN = τX and Ψ∗τX = τN.
For every y¯ such that LkτNG(y¯) = 0, ∀k ≥ 0, then x¯ = Φ(y¯) satisfies LkτXF (x¯) =
0, ∀k ≥ 0 and conversely.
Where Lτn is the lie derivative along the Cartan field τn.
Definition 2.1 The implicit system (X, τX, F ) is flat if and only if it is Lie-Bäcklund
equivalent to the trivial system (R, τm, 0).
Theorem 2.2 The system (X, τX, F ) is flat, if, and only if there exists a locally C∞
and invertible mapping Φ : Rm∞ 7→ X such that:
Φ∗dF = 0 (2.2)
Defining the polynomial matrices as follows:
dF =
∂F
∂x
dx+
∂F
∂x˙
dx˙ =
(
∂F
∂x
+
∂F
∂x˙
d
dt
)
, P (F )dx (2.3)
P (Φ0) ,
∑
j≥0
∂Φ0
∂y(j)
dj
dtj
(2.4)
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We thus can write
Φ∗dF = P (F )P (Φ0)dy (2.5)
By consequence, we have to find a polynomial matrix P (Φ0) solution to
P (F )P (Φ0) = 0 (2.6)
If F is restricted to be a meromorphic function 1, P (Φ0) may be obtained via the
Smith decomposition (see Appendix B) of P (F ).
The variational system P (F ) could be decomposed using the Smith decom-
position in:
V P (F )U = (In−m, 0n−m,m) (2.7)
Let us define K as a field of meromorphic functions from X to R, K
[
d
dt
]
as the
principal ring of K-polynomials of d
dt
= LτX , Mp,q
[
d
dt
]
the module of the p × q
matrices over K
[
d
dt
]
, with p and q arbitrary integers, and, U [ d
dt
]
is the group of
unimodular matrices of Mp,p
[
d
dt
]
.
By using this notation the set of hyper-regular matrices P (Φ) ∈ Mn,m
(
d
dt
)
satisfying (2.2) is given by:
P (Φ) = U

0n−m,m
Im

W (2.8)
Where U ∈ R − Smith(P (F )) and W ∈ Um
(
d
dt
)
is an arbitrary unimodular matrix.
Let us define:
Uˆ = U

0n−m,m
Im

 (2.9)
Lemma 2.3 For every matrix Q ∈ L − Smith(Uˆ), it exists a matrix Z ∈ Um
(
d
dt
)
such that:
1A meromorphic function on an open subset D of the complex plane is a function that is infinitely
differentiable and equal to its own Taylor series on all D except a set of isolated points, which are
poles for the function.
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QP (Φ) =

 Im
0n−m,m

Z (2.10)
Moreover, for every Q, the sub-matrix Qˆ = (0n−m,m, In−m)Q is equivalent to P (F ).
A flat output of the variational system is given by:
w(x¯) =


w1(x¯)
.
.
.
wm(x¯)

 = (Im, )0m−n−m)Qx¯dx|X0 (2.11)
if dw = 0, a flat output of the nonlinear implicit system (2.1) can be obtained by
integrating the equation dy = w. Otherwise, it is necessary to find and integral
base, if such base exists. This means that we have to find an integral factor M ∈
Um
(
d
dt
)
verifying d(Mw) = 0.
Definition 2.4 Strongly closed:
The K
(
d
dt
)
-ideal Ω, finitely generated by the 1-forms (w1, ...wm) defined by (2.11),
is strongly closed in X0, (or equivalently, the system (X, τmathfrakX , F ) is flat) if
and only if it exists an operator µ ∈ L1((Λ(X))m), and a matrix M ∈ Um
(
d
dt
)
such
that:
dw = µw, d(µ) = µ2, d(M) = −Mµ (2.12)
Where L1((Λ(X))m) is the space of linear operators which maps the p-forms of
dimension m in X in (P+1)-forms of dimension m in X, d represents the extension
of the exterior derivative d, where the coefficients have their value in K
(
d
dt
)
.
Additionally if the relation (2.12) is satisfied, a flat output z can be obtained
by integrating the system of equations dy =Mw.
This can be resumed in the next algorithm:
Compute the variational system P (F ) = δF
δx
+ δF
δx˙
d
dt
of (2.1), if P (F ) is not
hyper-regular the system is not flat.
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Compute the smith decomposition of P (F ).
Compute Uˆ = U

 0n−m,m
Im


.
Obtain the Smith decomposition of Uˆ .
Compute the vector of 1-form ω defined in (2.11)
Obtain the operator µ, such that dω = µω by identification term by term, if
possible.
If not, among the possible operators µ, keep only the operators who verifies
that d(µ) = µ2.
Determine by identification term by term, a matrixM , which validates d(M) =
−Mµ.
Between all the options of matrix M , keep only the unimodular matrices, if
such matrix does not exists, the system is not flat. On the contrary, a flat
output can be obtained by integrating the system of equations dy =Mω.
Example 2.5 Non holonomic car, see example 1.2.2
The system equations of the non holonomic car in its implicit representation are:
F (x, y, θ, x˙, y˙, θ˙) = x˙sinθ − y˙cosθ = 0 (2.13)
The first step is to compute the variational system:
P (F ) =
(
∂F
∂x
+
∂F
∂x˙
d
dt
,
∂F
∂y
+
∂F
∂y˙
d
dt
,
∂F
∂θ
+
∂F
∂θ˙
d
dt
)
=
(
sinθ
d
dt
, −cosθ d
dt
x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ
) (2.14)
Defining E = x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ, and permuting columns we can write the variational
system as follows:
P (F ) =
(
E, −cosθ d
dt
, sinθ
d
dt
)
(2.15)
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After applying the Smith decomposition algorithm, we obtain the unimodular ma-
trix U :
U =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1
E
cosθ
E
d
dt
−sinθ
E
d
dt

 (2.16)
Defining Uˆ as:
Uˆ = U (01,2, I2)
T =


0 1
1 0
cosθ
E
d
dt
−sinθ
E
d
dt

 (2.17)
After computing the Smith decomposition of Uˆ we obtain:
Q =


0 1 0
1 0 0
sinθ
E
d
dt
− cosθ
E
d
dt
1

 (2.18)
Multiply the matrix Q by (dx, dy, dθ)T . The last line is equal to 1
E
(sinθdx˙−cosθdy˙+
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)dθ) = 1
E
d(x˙sinθ − y˙cosθ), which is equal to zero, see (2.14). The
remaining part of the system:

0 1 0
1 0 0




dx
dy
dθ

 =

w1
w2

 (2.19)
is trivially strongly closed with M = I2, which finally gives the same set of flat
outputs z = [y, x]T computed in example 1.2.2.
The set of flat outputs is not unique, since it depends on the decomposition
of P (F ) and how explained in [41] it is not unique neither. Let us illustrate this with
the next example.
Example 2.6 Non holonomic car (2)
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By right multiplying the variational system depicted in (2.15) by:
Q =


cosθ 0 0
sinθ 1 0
0 0 1

 (2.20)
an using sinθ d
dt
(cosθ) − cosθ d
dt
(sinθ) = −θ˙. The Smith decomposition of P (F ) is
given by:
U =


cosθ −1
θ
cos2θ d
dt
1
θ
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)cosθ
sinθ 1− 1
θ
sinθcosθ d
dt
1
θ
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)sinθ
0 0 1

 (2.21)
The matrix Uˆ is equal to:
Uˆ =


−1
θ
cos2θ d
dt
1
θ
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)cosθ
1− 1
θ
sinθcosθ d
dt
1
θ
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)sinθ
0 1

 (2.22)
The Smith decomposition of Uˆ gives:
Q =


−tanθ 1 0
0 0 1
1
θ
sinθcosθ d
dt
−1
θ
cos2θ d
dt
−1
θ
(x˙cosθ + y˙sinθ)cosθ

 (2.23)
The vector of 1-forms w is given by:
w = [w1 w2]
T = Q[dx, dy, dθ]T = [−tanθdx + dy, dθ]T (2.24)
We have:
dw = [dw1, dw2]
T =
[
− 1
cos2θ
dθ ∧ dx, 0
]T
(2.25)
Which proofs that w is not closed.
We introduce the µ operator:
µ =

0 d ( xcos2θ)∧
0 0

 (2.26)
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Such operator µ verifies µ2 = 0. Additionally, we have:
d =

0 d ( 1cos2dx+ 2xsinθcos3θdθ)∧
0 0

 (2.27)
By componentwise identification:
M =

1 − xcos2θ
0 1

 (2.28)
We compute now the 1-form as follows:
Mw =

tan θdx+ dy − xcos2θdθ
dθ

 (2.29)
This 1-form is closed, and the flat output vector is:
z1 = y − xtanθ
z2 = θ
(2.30)
This method inspired the proposed FTC approach, in fact the decomposition of
P (F ) is not unique, an infinity number of them exists, this property could be ex-
ploited for FDI, since this will provide redundancy and will increase the number
of residual signals, additionally this redundancy could be used to reconfigure the
system after fault.
2.5 ANALYTICAL REDUNDANCY BY FLATNESS-BASED
APPROACH
Analytical redundancy can be afforded thanks to the main property of the
flat systems, which dictates that any input or state can be written as functions
of the flat outputs. This provides in a straight manner the redundancy needed to
compute the residues, which will indicate the presence of a fault, it will be close to
zero if no fault is present and different of it, if a fault affects the system.
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Residues are computed by simply comparing the measured variable versus
the estimated using the differentially flat equations. This approach is depicted in
the figure 2.3, the main advantage of this method is the fact that the estimations of
the states and the inputs are only functions of the flat outputs. This phenomenon
helps to determine the size of a fault, see for example [49] and [72].
2.5.1 FLATNESS-BASED FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
The main idea of the proposed approach is based in the principle that the
set of flat outputs are not unique, in fact, one can find an infinity number of them
(Linked with the matrix M in the algorithm), the idea is to find two or more sets
of flat outputs which at least one element inside one of the vectors is not an
algebraic combination of the first, this action will increase the number of residues,
additionally those will be decoupled between them, by consequence this could
increase the possibilities of isolate every single fault. Furthermore we consider
that the flat outputs are directly states of the system or a linear combination of
them and they are consider measured or at least estimated.
Let us consider a nonlinear flat model of dimension n, and m control inputs,
with zα as first set of flat outputs, which corresponds to m components of the
state vector, also suppose that the full state is measured, it is always possible to
compute n residues:
n - m state residues, because the full state is supposed to be measured.
m control inputs residues.
The residual signals are computed by using
rijx = xmk − xˆk (2.31)
riju = uml − uˆl (2.32)
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where xmk and umk are the kth measured state and control input respectively and
xˆk and uˆk are the kth state and control input calculated using the differentially
flat equations, i is the identifier of the set of flat outputs. In order to clarify the
proposed approach, suppose that we have a nonlinear system composed by four
states, [x1 x2 x3 x4]T ∈ n and two control inputs [u1 u2]T ∈ m, as depicted in
definition 1.1, the number of control inputs are equal to the number of flat out-
puts, by consequence [z] ∈ m, suppose too that the nonlinear system is flat
and additionnally we can find not one but two set of flat outputs, for instance
zα = [zα1 zα2]
T = [x1 x2]
T ∈ m and zβ = [zβ1 zβ2]T = [x3 x4]T ∈ m.
In order to show the advantage of founding two sets of flat outputs in which
at least one element present in the β set is not an algebraic combination of an
element of the α set, the approach is divided in two cases. Fig. 2.5.1 shows the
FDI schema.
2.5.2 CASE A: n RESIDUES
Assume now, that only zα vector exists, this hypothesis implies that:
The maximal number of residues is four.
Sensor faults not affecting flat outputs can be isolated depending on the
system.
Flat output sensor faults can be detected but cannot be isolated.
The n residues are obtained as follows:

rα1x
rα2x
rα1u
rα2u

 =


xm3
xm4
um1
um2

−


φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (e3)
T
φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (e4)
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (c1)
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (c2)
T

 (2.33)
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Figure 2.3: Detection diagram
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Fault rα1x rα2x rα1u rα2u
Fx1 1 1 1 1
Fx2 1 1 1 1
Fx3 1 0 0 0
Fx4 0 1 0 0
Fu1 0 0 1 0
Fu2 0 0 0 1
Table 2.2: n residues matrix
Where ea ∈ Rn, ea = 0, ∀a 6= k,ea = 1 ⇔ a = k, a = [1, 2, ..n] and cb ∈ Rm,
cb = 0, ∀b 6= l,cb = 1⇔ b = l, b = [1, 2, ..m]. Observing in detail equation 2.33, it is
straightforward to see that if a fault affects the state measure of (xm3), the residual
rα1x will be affected, the rest of residues are independent of this measure, so they
will not be affected by the fault. A fault affecting the other state measure or the
actuators can be treated in the same manner.
When a fault affects one of the flat outputs, all the residues will be affected,
by consequence the fault can be detected but it cannot be isolated. The residues
matrix is presented in table 2.2.
2.5.3 CASE B: n+ n RESIDUES
Suppose now, that two sets of flat outputs are found, (zα and zβ), this hy-
pothesis denotes that:
The maximal number of residues is eight.
Sensor faults not affecting flat outputs can be detected and isolated.
Unfaulty versions of the algebraically independent flat outputs could be com-
puted. This property is specially useful to reconfigure the system after fault,
this method will be developed in section 2.6.
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Fault rα1x rα2x rα1u rα2u r
β
1x r
β
2x r
β
1u r
β
2u
Fx1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Fx2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Fx3 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Fx4 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Fu1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Fu2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Table 2.3: n + n residues matrix
Using the two algebraically independent set of flat outputs, eight residues are
computed, those are the next:

rα1x
rα2x
rα1u
rα2u
rβ1x
rβ2x
rβ1u
rβ2u


=


xm3
xm4
um1
um2
xm1
xm2
um1
um2


−


φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (e3)
T
φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (e4)
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (c1)
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) (c2)
T
φβx(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) (e1)
T
φβx(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) (e2)
T
φβu(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) (c1)
T
φβu(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) (c2)
T


(2.34)
Where ea ∈ Rn, ea = 0, ∀a 6= k,ea = 1 ⇔ a = k, a = [1, 2, ..n] and cb ∈ Rm,
cb = 0, ∀b 6= l,cb = 1⇔ b = l, b = [1, 2, ..m].
This time if a fault affects x1, all the zα residues and rβ1x will be triggered; this
time the fault is detected and isolated, the same principle can be now applied to
every single fault affecting the system, either sensor or actuator faults. Table 2.3
presents the faults signature belonging to each fault.
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2.5.4 DETECTION ROBUSTNESS
For this work the fault detection is achieved by simply comparing the residual
amplitude versus a fixed detection threshold.
The amplitude of the detection threshold is fixed by running series of faulty
free simulations of the system. The simulations are run with a +− 10 % individual
variation of the parameters of the system, two extra simulations are realized, one
varying +10 % all the parameters and other varying them −10 %.
Finally the amplitude of the detection threshold is fixed by selecting the worst
case among all the results of the simulations, plus a security marge. Such marge
is added in order to avoid false alarms caused by the measure noise or modeling
errors.
2.5.5 DERIVATIVES ESTIMATION
In order to compute the system states and the control inputs of the system,
and consequently the residual signals, the time derivatives of the flat outputs of
the system has to be estimated.
In this work a high-gain observer [74] is used to evaluate the time derivative
of noisy signals.
In order to improve the performance of the high-gain observer, a low-pass
filter is synthesized, the filter order is fixed regarding the maximal derivative used
in the differentially flat equations, hence a better noise filtering is obtained. Let us
define the equation of the high-gain observer:
ˆ˙x = Aˆxˆ+ Bˆu (2.35)
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Where:
Aˆ =


−ζ1/ 1 ... ... 0
−ζ2/2 0 1 ... 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−ζn−1/n−1 ... ... 0 1
−ζn/n ... ... ... 0


(2.36)
And:
Bˆ =
[
−ζ1/ − ζ2/2 . . . − ζn−1/n−1 − ζn/n
]T (2.37)
The polynomial Sn + ζ1Sn−1 + ...+ ζn−1S + ζn is Hurwitz and  << 0. The transfer
function from u to xˆ when ⇒ 0 is T (s) = [1 S ... Sn−2 Sn−1]T , the system acts as a
differentiator under the consideration that the input u is continuous and derivable.
In this case the n− 1 derivatives are obtained directly from the state vector.
A possible selection of the coefficients ζi(i = 1, · · ·n) is in such a way that the
frequency bandwidth of the signal to be derivated is in the frequency bandwidth
of the filter 1/(Sn + ζ1Sn−1 + · · ·+ ζn−1S + ζn) and the  small enough.
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2.6 CONTROL RECONFIGURATION FOR DIFFERENTIALLY
FLAT SYSTEMS
In order to complement the FTC strategy, control accommodation or control
reconfiguration is needed, see 1.9. This work is focused in control reconfigura-
tion,those techniques has as principal characteristic that they keep the nominal
controller synthesized during the design phase. This property permits to reduce
the response time to a fault. This metodology has as principal characteristic the
fact that both stages FDI and reconfiguration are melted in the same block, this
characteristic will reduce the time response after fault and could reduce the com-
putational charge of the processor. The goal here is to hide the fault to the con-
troller by changing the faulty reference by an unfaulty one. Fig. 2.4 shows the
reconfiguration schema.
System
Dynamics
φαx(zα1, zα2)
φβx(zβ1, zβ2)
φβu(zβ1, zβ2)
φαu(zα1, zα2)
Actuators
Faults
Sensors
Faults
Xm
Trajectory
Generation
φαu(zα1, zα2)
∆f
∆f
∆f
∆f
Computed states
Measured states
Switch triggers
+ +
Decision
Algorithm
K
zα
zβ
Um
Xm
xˆ
xˆ
rαix
rαiu
rβix
rβiu
First set of differentially
f lat equations
−
−
−
−
−
Figure 2.4: Reconfiguration diagram
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Let us retake the example ??, one more time in order to show how found-
ing two or more algebraically independent flat outputs will help to improve the
reconfiguration technique, the method will be divided in two different cases.
2.6.1 CASE A: PARTIAL RECONFIGURATION
Partial reconfiguration is achieved, if only one set of flat outputs is found,
for example zα, as explained in section 2.5.2, faults affecting flat outputs cannot
be isolated, see table 2.2, however faults affecting measuring sensors can be
detected and isolated. Thanks to the properties of the flat systems and the fact
that the flat outputs are considered fault-free at any time, we can compute the rest
of system states. Those signals can then be used to reconfigure the system.
Empirically the number of reconfigurable faults can be obtained by using the
next formula:
NFLAR = (FOS)(n−m) (2.38)
Where FOS is the number of sets of flat outputs found, n the state dimension
and m the number of control inputs. For instance for our example the number of
redundant signals is (1)(4 − 2) = 2, which are in fact the two states that are not
flat outputs x3 and x4.
2.6.2 CASE B: FULL RECONFIGURATION
Suppose now that two sets of flat outputs are found, zα and zβ. Using the
n + n residues every single fault can be detected and isolated, and additionally,
the unfaulty set of flat outputs can be used to estimate the faulty state, and then,
use this new version to feed the controller and reconfigure the system. See Fig.
2.4.
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Let us analyze a fault affecting x1, if we see in detail the equation 2.34 it is
straightforward to see that all the equations containing z1α in the right hand will
modify their shape. Since the fault affects the measure of the first state, the first
residue rα1x will be affected as well, however a faulty-free version of x1 is computed
using the measures of the zβ set. This signal could be used to hide the fault to the
controller. Each fault could be treated in the same manner, which proofs that the
system is fully reconfigurable.
2.7 CONCLUSION
This chapter presents the proposed approach for FTC. Additive and multi-
plicative faults affecting sensors and actuators can be treated in the same manner
for detection and isolation. Active reconfiguration is only carried out for sensor
faults, actuators faults are rejected by the controller.
The main advantage of the proposed approach is the fact that it melts the
FDI process together with the reconfiguration, this action adds simplicity during
the design and could reduce the time response to a fault and the computational
charge as well.
The next chapter is devoted to investigate the feasibility of the proposed ap-
proach, for this, two nonlinear systems will be considered. An unmanned quadro-
tor and the three tank system, both of them belongs to the group of flat systems,
the technique can be applied in a partial manner in the unmanned quadrotor, and
will be applied completely in the three tank system.
CHAPTER 3
FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL:
APPLICATIONS
Abstract:
In this chapter feasibility of the proposed approach is investigated
in two nonlinear systems, first it is applied in a partial way to an
unmanned quadrotor and in a second time the full technique is
applied to a three tank system.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter is devoted to investigate the feasibility of the proposed FTC
approach. It is divided in two main parts, the first one is devoted to present the
nonlinear model of an unmanned quadrotor, for this nonlinear system the FTC
technique is not applied entirely, since this system does not meet all the necessary
conditions, however as explained in sections 2.5.2 and 2.6.1 the technique can be
applied in a partial manner.
The second part is devoted to apply the technique in a three tank system,
this system in contrast to the UAV meets all the necessary conditions to exploit at
maximum the proposed approach.
3.2 UNMANNED QUADROTOR
The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) defines an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as “an aircraft which is designed or modified, not
to carry a human pilot and is operated through electronic input initiated by the
flight controller or by an onboard autonomous flight management control system
that does not require flight controller intervention” [63]. See Fig. 3.1 The most
important characteristic of this kind of vehicles is that they can be recovered at
the end of the mission, this property excludes rockets, missiles, shells, etc. The
UAV’s have been serving the army since the decade of 90’s, however, thanks to
their versatility, and the progress in electronics manufacturing, they are nowadays
being used in civil applications, [20] for example:
Remote sensing and earth science research, [33].
Search and rescue in human hostile zones (e.g., radiation zones, unstable
zones after an earthquake).
Weather monitoring.
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Figure 3.1: UAV communication system
Crop spraying and dusting.
Fire fighting, [6].
Communications networks, [16].
The European Association of Unmanned Vehicles Systems (EUROUVS) has
drawn up a clasiffication of uav systems based on such parameters as flight alti-
tude, endurance, speed, maximum take off weight, size, etc., this classification is
shown in table 3.1.
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Category Maximum take- Maximum flight Endurance Data link Example
(Acronym) off Weight (kg) altitude (m) (hours) range (Km) Missions Systems
Micro/ mini UAV’s
Micro (MAV) 0.10 250 1 <10 Scouting, surveillance Black widow, Microstar,
inside buildings. Fancopter, Mosquito.
Mini <30 150-300 <2 <10
Film and broadcast ind., Mikado, Aladin, Tracker,
agriculture, pollution Dragon eye, Raven, Skorpio,
measurements, Robocopter, Pointer II,
communications relay. YH-300SL.
Tactical UAV’s
Close Range
150 3,000 2-4 10-30
Mine detection, search Observer I, Phantom, Copter 4
(CR) and rescue. Robocopter 300, Camcopter.
Short Range
200 3,000 3-6 30-70 mine detection.
Luna, SilverFox,
(SR) EyeView, Hornet.
Long Range
- 5,000 6-13 200-500 Communications relay.
Hunter,
(LR) Vigilante 502.
Endurance
500-1500 5,000-8,000 12-24 >500
Battle damage Aerosonde,
(EN) assessment. Shadow 600.
Medium Altitude,
1,000-1,500 5,000-8,000 24-48 >500
Weapons delivery, Skyforce, Heron TP,
Long Endurance Communications MQ-1 Predator, Darkstar.
(MALE) relay. Eagle 1 and 2,
Strategic UAV’s
High Altitude,
2,500-12,500 15,000-20,000 24-48 >2000
boost phase intercept Global Hawk, Raptor, Condor,
Long Endurance launch vehicle, Theseus, Helios, Libellule,
(HALE) airport security. EuroHawk.
Special Task UAV’s
Lethal (LET) 250 3,000-4,000 3-4 300 Anti-radar,anti-aircraft. MALI, Harpy, Lark, Marula.
Decoys (DEC) 250 50-5,000 <4 0-500 Aerial and naval Flyrt, MALD, Nulka,
deception. ITALD, Chukar.
Stratospheric
- 20,000-30,000 >48 >2,000 - Pegasus.(Strato)
Exo-stratospheric
- >30,000 - - - MarsFlyer, MAC-1.(EXO)
Table 3.1: UAV’s Classification
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3.2.1 NONLINEAR MODEL
The operation of the quadrotor is fairly simple, the position (ξ = x, y, z) and
the orientation (η = ψ, θ, φ) desired are achieved by independently varying the
speed and torque of the four rotors, see figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Quadrotor schema
The vertical movement is obtained by adding the lift forces generated for
each rotor, in order to avoid that the helicopter turns over the z axis, two rotors
turn in the clockwise sense (rotors 2 and 4) and the two others turn in the counter-
clockwise, this configuration cancel the horizontal moment of the helicopter, which
is specially helpful during the hover position. The pitch moment (θ) is achieved by
varying the rotation speeds of the rotors 1 and 3, the roll (φ) is obtained by vary-
ing the rotation speeds of the rotors 2 and 4 and finally the yaw moment (ψ) is
obtained from the torque resulting from the substracting of the clockwise (rotors 2
and 4) and the counterclockwise (rotors 1 and 3).
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The nonlinear model can be obtained by using the motion equations of Euler-
Lagrange. The Lagrangian (L) is defined as the addition of the kinetics (T ) and
the potential (U) energies.
L = Ttranslation + Trotation + U (3.1)
Where:
Ttranslation =
m
2
ξ˙T ξ˙ (3.2)
Trotation =
1
2
ΩT IΩ =
1
2
η˙TJη˙ (3.3)
Where m is the mass of the helicopter and
Ω =


φ˙− ψ˙sinθ
θ˙cosφ+ ψ˙cosθsinφ
ψ˙cosθcosφ− θ˙sinφ

 (3.4)
J = J(η) =W Tη IWη (3.5)
Wη =


−sinθ 0 1
cosθsinθ cosθ 0
cosθcosφ −sinφ 0

 (3.6)
The inertial matrix has elements only in the principal diagonal, because the
aircraft is considered symmetric.
I =


Ixx 0 0
0 Iyy 0
0 0 Izz

 (3.7)
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The potential energy is equal to:
U = −mgz (3.8)
Assembling all the parts the equation (3.1) can be wrote in the next manner:
L =
m
2
ξ˙T ξ˙ +
1
2
η˙TJη˙ −mgz (3.9)
Which satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation.
d
dt
(
∂L
∂q˙
)
−
(
∂L
∂q
)
= FL (3.10)
Where FL stands for the forces and moments applied to the body frame of
the aircraft. Due that the Lagrangian does not contain cross terms combining the
position and the orientation, the Euler-Lagrange equation can be divided in the
dynamics of the ξ and η coordinates individually.
By this manner the dynamic model can be wrote as follows:
 ddt
(
∂Ltranslation
∂ξ˙
)
− ∂Ltranslation
∂ξ
0
0 d
dt
(
∂Lrotation
∂η˙
)
− ∂Lrotation
∂η

 =

 f
τ

 (3.11)
Where f = RFL, is the force applied to the aircraft due to the lift generated
by the four rotors and τ represents the moments of pitch, roll and yaw.
FL =


0
0
u

 (3.12)
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u = f1 + f2 + f3 + f4 (3.13)
Where fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is the force produced for each one of the rotor, fi =
kiw
2
i . And:
τ =


τψ
τθ
τφ

 =


Σ4i=1τMi
(f2 − f4)l
(f3 − f1)l

 (3.14)
Where l is the distance between rotors and the center of gravity, and τMi is
the moment produced by the motor i.
Finally, the nonlinear model can be obtained by solving the Euler-Lagrange
equations for position and orientation. For position:
d
dt
(
∂Ltraslacional
∂ξ˙
)
− ∂Ltraslacional
∂ξ
= f (3.15)
Substituying the value of LTranslational and adding the potential energy because it
cause a movement in the z axis, we obtain:
d
dt
(
∂m
2
(x˙2 + y˙2 + z˙2) +mgz
∂ξ˙
)
− ∂
m
2
(x˙2 + y˙2 + z˙2) +mgz
∂ξ
= f (3.16)
By computing the derivative we obtain:
d
dt
(m
2
(2x˙+ 2y˙ + 2z˙)
)
+ 0− 0− 0−mg = f (3.17)
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Finally computing the time derivative and rearranging in vector form, we ob-
tain the equations related to the position coordinates.
f =


mx¨
my¨
mz¨ −mg

 (3.18)
For the orientation coordinates:
d
dt
(
∂Lrotacional
∂η˙
)
− ∂Lrotacional
∂η
(3.19)
Substituying we obtain:
d
dt
(
∂(1
2
η˙TJη˙)
∂η˙
)
− ∂(
1
2
η˙TJη˙)
∂η
(3.20)
Computing the derivatives:
d
dt
(
1
2
(
∂η˙T
∂η˙
+ 0 + η˙TJ
∂η˙
∂η˙
))
− 1
2
(
0 +
∂
∂η
(η˙TJη˙ + 0
)
= τ (3.21)
Computing the time derivative:
Jη¨ + J˙η˙ − 1
2
(
∂
∂η
(
η˙TJη˙
))
= τ (3.22)
In order to write the equation above in the general form M(η)η¨+C(η, η˙)η˙ = τ
we factorize η˙ to the right as follows:
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Jη˙ +
(
J˙− 1
2
∂
∂η
(η˙TJ)
)
η˙ = τ (3.23)
By this way we can define the coriolis matrix (C(η, η˙)) and the inertial matrix
in the next manner:
C(η, η˙) = J˙η˙ − 1
2
(
∂
∂η
(
η˙TJη˙
)) (3.24)
M(η) = J(η) = W Tη IWη (3.25)
Finally the nonlinear dynamical model of the quadrotor is:
f =


mx¨
my¨
mz¨ −mg

 (3.26)
τ =M(η)η¨ + C(η, η˙)η˙ (3.27)
In order to simplify the model let us introduce the change of input variables
proposed in [7].
τ˜ =


τ˜ψ
τ˜θ
τ˜φ

 =M(η)−1 (τ − C(η, η˙)η˙) (3.28)
Where τ˜ = η¨, are the new inputs, after this transformation the nonlinear
model becomes:
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mx¨ = −u1sinθ
my¨ = u1cosθsinφ
mz¨ = u1cosθcosφ−mg
ψ¨ = u2
θ¨ = u3 (3.29)
φ¨ = u4
By this way the nonlinear model is compound by twelve states,
X = [x y z x˙ y˙ z˙ ψ θ φ ψ˙ θ˙ φ˙]T = [x1 x2x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 x10 x11 x12]
T and the
control inputs are U = [u1 ψ¨ θ¨ φ¨]T = [u1 u2 u3 u4]T .
3.2.2 FLAT MODEL
The goal in the flatness approach is explicitly express all the states and all
the control inputs as functions of the flat outputs and a finite number of its time
derivatives, so, from the equations 3.29, and defining the flat outputs as zα =
[x y z ψ]T [14], because we have four control inputs. Besides we can write all the
system states as function of the flat outputs zα and its time derivatives as follows:
x = z1
y = z2
z = z3
ψ = z4
θ = asin
(
mz¨1
−u1
)
φ = atan
(
z¨2
z¨3 + g
)
x˙ = z˙1
y˙ = z˙2
z˙ = z˙3 (3.30)
ψ˙ = z˙4
θ˙ = −m
(
z
(3)
1 u1 − u21z¨1
u21
√
α
)
φ˙ =
z
(3)
2 (z¨3 + g)− z(3)3 z¨2
(z¨3 + g)2 + z¨2
2
In a similar way the control inputs are expressed as function of the flat out-
puts and its time derivatives.
u1 = m
√
z¨21 + z¨
2
2 + z¨
2
3 + 2z¨3g + g
2
u2 = z¨4 (3.31)
u3 = −m


(
(z
(4)
1 u1 − u¨1z¨1)u21
√
A
)
− (z(3)1 u1 − u¨1z¨1) (C) + 2u1u˙1
√
A
u41A


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u4 =
(z
(4)
2 (z¨3 + g) + z
(3)
2 z
(3)
3 − z(4)3 z¨2 − z(3)3 z(3)2 )(z(3)2 (z¨3 + g)− z(3)z¨2)− B
(z¨3 + g)4 + (z¨2)4
where
A = 1−
(
mz¨1
u1
)2
(3.32)
B = (2(z¨3 + g)z
(3)
3 + 2z¨2z
(3)
2 )(z
(3)
2 (z¨3 + g)− z(3)3 z¨2) (3.33)
C = (
−2mz¨1(mz(3)1 u1 − u˙1mz¨1)
u1
√
α
(3.34)
3.2.3 FLATNESS-BASED FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF A
QUADROTOR UAV
Additive faults affecting sensors and control inputs (combination of actua-
tors, see (3.14)) are considered. For sensors measuring xm5 (θ) and xm6 (φ) dif-
ferent faults amplitudes are consider, see Table 3.2 such amplitude defines the
FTC strategy used to counteract the fault. For sensors measuring flat outputs
z1, z2 and z3 an additive fault of one meter is considered. For the flat output z4,
1◦ extra is applied. Only single faults are considered. Reconfiguration after fault
is taken into account only for measuring sensors. Once the fault appears (50 s)
it is recurrent until the end of the simulation. Since the FTC strategy needs to
know the amplitude of the fault, in order to decide which strategy will be used. For
simplicity sake on this work the fault amplitude is supposed perfectly known, by
consequence the strategy choice is straightforward. Section 2.5.4 describes how
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Fault Amplitude Strategy Amplitude Strategy Amplitude Strategy
Fx5 < 1.8
◦ P 1 > 1.8◦ < 4.6◦ Rf 1 >4.6◦ Re1,2
Fx6 < 1.8
◦ P > 1.8◦ < 3.9◦ Rf >3.9◦ Re
Table 3.2: Additives faults for the UAV
1P =Passive, Rf =Reconfiguration, Re =Restructuring. 2This approach is out of
the bounds of this work.
the detection threshold is fixed. The parameter that change is the mass (m) of the
helicopter, the nominal value is 0.52Kg. The controller in charge of close the loop
is an LQR, the matrices Q and R are chosen in order to respect the power bounds
of the actuators. The nominal trajectories are created using order 5th polynomials.
White noise is added to the signal in order to simulate real operation. High gain
observers are used to compute the time derivatives, low-pass filters are coupled
with the observers. A trade-off between the time delay caused by the filter and
the cut-off frequency needs to be studied in detail. A cut-off frequency very high
will not reduce properly the amplitude of the noise, on the other hand, higher the
frequency of the filter the time delay induced will be more important, this delay
could prevent the use of the reconfiguration, because if the estimated signal is not
in phase with the measure the fact that change between references could drive
the system to instability.
3.2.3.1 FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
For this particular system only one set of flat outputs is found, by conse-
quence n = 12 residues are found, which is in fact the number of states, however,
for simplicity sake the time derivatives of the three position states and the three
orientation states, x7 to x12 are consider unfaulty at any time, such supposition
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produces only six residues, which are presented in equation (3.35).

r1x
r2x
r1u
r2u
r3u
r4u


=


xm5
um6
um1
um2
um3
um4


−


φx(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [0(4) 1 0(7)]
T
φx(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [0(5) 1 0(6)]
T
φu(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [1 0 0 0]
T
φu(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [0 1 0 0]
T
φu(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [0 0 1 0]
T
φu(z1, z˙1, z2, z˙2) [0 0 0 1]
T


(3.35)
For faults affecting measuring sensors two different frameworks are consid-
ered. See Table 3.2. However for FDI the fault amplitude is not a key parameter,
since the fault signature is the same regardless of the amplitude fault. All residues
are normalized between -1 and +1, those edges represents the minimal and max-
imal amplitude of the fault-free threshold.
Let us analyze each individual fault. For instance a fault affecting measure
of x displacement should affect each one of the six residues because it is a
flat output, however the system is naturally decoupled. By consequence only the
residues depending on the xm1 measure are affected. Those are r1x, r1u and r3u,
see equations (3.30) and (3.31). See Fig. 3.3. This behavior is due to the opera-
tion of the UAV, in fact since the axis of the four rotors are fixed to the main frame
(cannot tilt) the horizontal displacement can only be obtained by tilting the entire
frame in order to move the airplane. By consequence the residues which depends
directly of θ are impacted. The residual r1u is affected because it depends of the
time derivative of x.
Figure 3.4 shows the residues obtained after a fault on sensor y. This time
the fault affects the residues related to φ (r2x and r4u). This is due to the same phe-
nomenon presented in the x axis. Once again the residue r1u is affected because
it depends on the faulty measure.
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Figure 3.3: Additive fault measure x1 residues normalized
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Figure 3.4: Additive fault measure x2 residues normalized
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A fault affecting the high measure (z) will impact five of six residues. Because
it is present directly or indirectly in the equations used to estimate the states and
the control inputs. See equations (3.30) and (3.31). The residue not affected de-
pends only on the yaw (ψ) movement of the airplane, by consequence residue r4u
is not affected by the fault effect.
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Figure 3.5: Additive fault measure x3 residues normalized
Finally Fig. 3.6 present the residues for a fault affecting the sensor measur-
ing the yaw angle. Residual r4u is directly related to this measure, by consequence
it is triggered.
Fault affecting the pitch angle, xm5 will trigger all the residues depending
on θ, such residues are r1x and r2u. However, even if the residue r1u is affected
indirectly (via the x displacement) the amplitude change is not enough to exceeds
the threshold, see Fig. 3.7.
For roll angle xm6 is quite similar, it differs in the fact that this time the residue
r1u is affected by the y displacement. Fig. 3.8.
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Figure 3.6: Additive fault measure x4 residues normalized
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Figure 3.7: Additive fault measure x5 residues normalized
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Figure 3.8: Additive fault measure x6 residues normalized
For control inputs faults, the fault amplitude is equals to a 20 % of the max-
imal value of the nominal trajectory, see Table 3.2. Faults affecting control input
u1 could be detected and isolated, Fig. 3.9. However faults in the next three con-
trol inputs are hidden by the noise. Such faults becomes detectable and isolable
if the amplitude is augmented, however even if the movement of the aircraft is
completely oversized (displacements of more than 100 meters) the control inputs
has as maximum an amplitude of 0.02, by consequence an enormous fault, for
instance equal to one, is completely unrealistic. Such faults are not considered.
3.2.3.2 CONTROL RECONFIGURATION
For this section only faults of sensors xm5 and xm6 are considered. the num-
ber of redundant available signals is (1)*(12-4)=8, see 2.38. This number is re-
duced to two, because as in the FDI part, the states x7 to x12 are considered
fault-free at any time, so reconfiguration is not needed.
CHAPTER 3. FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL: APPLICATIONS 76
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r1x
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r2x
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r1u
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r2u
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r3u
20 40 60 80 100
−1
0
1
Time [s]
r4u
Figure 3.9: Additive fault control input u1 residues normalized
The goal of the reconfiguration method is to hide the fault to the controller,
this is achieved by computing a fault-free reference using the differentially flat
equations 3.30. The strategy to change the controller reference is only switch
between the signal coming from the sensor and the signal computed with the
equation 3.30. Possible instabilities due to the switch effect are not consider in
this work.
Figures 3.10 and 3.11 shows the comparison between FTC Passive ap-
proach (—), FTC active proposed approach (−·−) and nominal behavior (−−−)
for faults affecting θ and φ measurement sensors. In the passive case the switch
is not activated, the signal coming from sensor stills the same, the fault is rejected
by the controller. On the other hand if the amplitude fault exceeds the limits of
the passive approach, the switch is triggered in order to change the signal com-
ing from the measuring sensor by the estimation computed with the differentially
flat system equations. This action has as consequence the reconfiguration of the
control loop. See Figs. 3.10 and 3.11.
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Fault r1x r2x r1u r2u r3u r4u
Fx1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Fx2 0 1 1 0 0 1
Fx3 1 1 1 0 1 1
Fx4 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fx5 1 0 03 0 1 0
Fx6 0 1 03 0 0 1
Fu1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 3.3: Residues matrix Quadrotor UAV
3This residue is affected but the amplitude is not enough to exceed the threshold.
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Figure 3.10: Reconfiguration after fault x5. Passive (—). Proposed approach
(−·−). Nominal (−−−).
The effectiveness of the proposed approach presented in the previous fig-
ures could be compared versus the Figs. 3.12 and 3.13. It is straightforward to
see that if the control is not reconfigured the system became quickly unstable. In
both figures the yaw (ψ) is not touched, this phenomenon is explained because
the physical decoupling between this angle and the pitch and roll angles.
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Figure 3.11: Reconfiguration after fault x6. Passive (—). Proposed approach
(−·−). Nominal (−−−).
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Figure 3.12: Fault affecting x5. No-reconfiguration (· · · ). Nominal (−−−).
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Figure 3.13: Fault x6. No-reconfiguration (· · · ). Nominal (−−−).
3.3 THREE TANK SYSTEM
The system is compose by three tanks connected one next each other, the
three of them has the same surface section S, a central reservoir and two inflow
pumps. Each tank is linked to the central reservoir by means of a pipe, in which
the flow is adjustable manually. The tanks are related with pipes of section Sn.
See Fig. 3.14.
3.3.1 NONLINEAR MODEL
The water level inside each tank is proportional to the integral of the flows
inside the pipes, by consequence we can write the next equations:
Sx˙1 = −Q10(x1)−Q13(x1, x3) + u1
Sx˙2 = −Q20(x2) +Q32(x2, x3) + u2
Sx˙3 = Q13(x1, x3)−Q32(x2, x3)−Q30(x3)
(3.36)
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Figure 3.14: Three tank system
Where S is the transverse section of the tanks, xi, i = 1, 2, 3 water level of
each tank, Qi0, i = 1, 2, 3 the outflow between each tank and the central reservoir,
Q13 and Q32 are the outflow between tank 1 and tank 3 and the outflow between
tanks 3 and 2 respectively, u1 and u2 are the incoming flows of each pump.
The valves connecting tanks one and three with the central reservoir are
considered closed, so Q10 and Q30 are always equals to zero. The flows Q13, Q32
and Q20 can be expressed as follows:
Q13(x1, x3) = az1Sn
√
2g(x1 − x3)
Q20(x2) = az2Sn
√
2g(x2) (3.37)
Q32(x2, x3) = az3Sn
√
2g(x3 − x2)
Where Sn represents the transverse section of the pipes connecting the
tanks and azr, r = 1, 2, 3 represents the flow coefficients.
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3.3.2 FLAT MODEL
The flat model is computed by defining x1 and x3 as flat outputs, zα =
[x1 x3]
T
, so the differentially flat equations can be writen as follows:
xα1 = zα1
xα2 = zα2 −
1
2g
(
az1Sn
√
2g(zα1 − zα2)− Sz˙α2
az3Sn
)2
xα3 = zα2 (3.38)
uα1 = Sz˙α1 + az1Sn
√
2g(zα1 − zα2)
uα2 = Sx˙
α
2 − az3Sn
√
2g(zα2 − xα2 ) + az2Sn
√
2gxα2
φαx(zα1, zα2) =
[
xα1 x
α
2 x
α
3
]T (3.39)
φαu(zα1, zα2) =
[
uα1 u
α
2
]T (3.40)
As mentioned above the flat vector for this system, is not unique, so, it is
possible to use zβ = [x2 x3]T in order to compute another set of differentially flat
equations.
xβ1 = zβ2 +
1
2g
(
az3Sn
√
2g(zβ2 − zβ1) + S ˙zβ2
az1Sn
)2
xβ2 = zβ1
xβ3 = zβ2 (3.41)
uβ1 = Sx˙
β
1 + az1Sn
√
2g(xβ1 − zβ2)
uβ2 = Sz˙β1 − az3Sn
√
2g(zβ2 − zβ1) + az2Sn
√
2gzβ1
φβx(zβ1, zβ2) =
[
xβ1 x
β
2 x
β
3
]T (3.42)
φβu(zβ1, zβ2) =
[
uβ1 u
β
2
]T (3.43)
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3.3.3 FLATNESS-BASED FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL OF A THREE
TANK SYSTEM
This time additive and multiplicative faults are considered, such faults can
affect sensors and actuators. Faults affecting the actuators are consider rejected
by the controller, by consequence reconfiguration is not needed.
For additive faults, a +8cm fault is considered for sensors and for flow actu-
ators an extra flow of 0.8 ∗ 10−5m3/s is added. Concerning multiplicative faults a
20% failure is considered for sensors and actuators. Only one single fault is con-
sidered at any time, once the fault appears (at 250 s) it is recurrent until the end
of the simulation.
The detection threshold is fixed as explained in section 2.5.4, if it is exceeded
the fault is consider detected. The parameters varying for this system are the flow
coefficients, az1 and az3. Nominal values are equal to 0.75 and 0.76 respectively,
the transverse section of the tanks S and the transverse section of the connecting
pipes Sn are 15.4 ∗ 10−3 and 5 ∗ 10−5 respectively. Both sections remains with out
changes during the process to fix the threshold and the simulations.
The control loop is closed with an state feedback LQR controller, the ma-
trix Q and R are chosen in order to respect the mechanical limits of the pumps
and avoid outflow peaks. Additionally, saturation functions are connected to both
pumps, an integral action on level measures in tanks 1 and 2 is added in order to
eliminate the steady state error.
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The nominal trajectories are computed as in Appendix A, the polynomial
degree is again five, in order to create sufficiently differentiable curves. White
noise is added to the measured outputs with a relevant level to the real process
measure level. Derivatives are estimated by using a high-gain observer, see 2.5.5
coupled to a low-pass filter to reduce the amplitude of the noise and improve the
derivative estimation. Once again a trad-off between time delay and noise filtering
is taken into account.
Let us develop the FTC approach dividing it in two different cases.
3.3.3.1 CASE A
FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Let us only analyze the case when only one set of flat outputs is found, in
this system zα = [x1, x3]T , for FDI this supposition implies the three hypothesis
presented in section 2.5.2. By consequence three residues can be computed as
in 3.44. 

rα1x
rα1u
rα2u

 =


xm2
um1
um2

−


φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [0 1 0]
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [1 0]
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [0 1]
T

 (3.44)
Let us analyze each individual fault. Examining equation (3.44) is straightforward
to see that all the right hand of it, is in function of the α set of flat outputs, by
consequence if a fault is present in the measure xm1 or xm3, all the residues will
be impacted, such effect will indicate the presence of a fault but preventing the
isolation because both faults will have the same fault signature. The phenomenon
is the same with additive and multiplicative fault indistinctly. See Figs. 3.15, 3.16,
3.17 and 3.18.
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Figure 3.15: Additive fault measure x1 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.16: Additive fault measure x3 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.17: Multiplicative fault measure x1 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.18: Multiplicative fault measure x3 normalized (zα set)
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Faults affecting actuators will impact rα1u, if the fault is presented in pump u1
and if the fault affects pump u2 the residual signal that will change it’s amplitude
will be rα2u. Fault affecting actuator u1 is detected and isolated by simply comparing
the amplitude of the residual signal versus the threshold amplitude, Figs.3.19 and
3.21. However this strategy in not effective for a fault affecting the actuator u2,
even if the residual signal change the amplitude, it is not big enough to exceed the
threshold, Figs. 3.20 and 3.22. Such small change could be detected with another
type of decision algorithm. On the other hand sensor fault in high measure of tank
number 2 can be detected and isolated, since only rα1x is in function of xm2 and
by consequence only this residue is affected, providing by this way a particular
fault signature. Table 3.4 resume the results. The fault signatures are the same
for additive and multiplicative faults.
Fault rα1x rα1u rα2u
Fx1 1 1 1
Fx2 1 04 1
Fx3 1 1 1
Fu1 0 1 0
Fu2 0 0 04
Table 3.4: Residues matrix Three tanks Case A
4This residue is affected but the amplitude is not enough to exceed the threshold.
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Figure 3.19: Additive fault in flow pump u1 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.20: Additive fault in flow pump u2 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.21: Multiplicative fault in flow pump u1 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.22: Multiplicative fault in flow pump u2 normalized (zα set)
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Figures 3.23 and 3.24 shows the three residual signals obtained when a fault
affects the high measure of tank number two. Such behavior is explained by the
directly relation of the rα1x and the measure coming from sensor of the tank number
two. Since this tank is directly related to the pump number two, the controller
tries to compensate the fault, such reaction impact the residual which depends
on pump two. Residual rα1u is affected because the pump number one tries to
compensate the fault, however this is not directly related, by consequence the
amplitude is not enough to exceeds the threshold and the fault can be detected but
cannot be isolated. Such effect could be avoided by using a more sophisticated
FDI decision algorithm.
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Figure 3.23: Additive fault measure x2 normalized (zα set)
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Figure 3.24: Multiplicative fault measure x2 normalized (zα set)
CONTROL RECONFIGURATION
The number of redundant signals and by consequence the number of re-
configurable faults could be obtained using the equation (2.38), so, the number
of redundant signals available is (1) ∗ (3 − 2) = 1. The only signal that could be
estimated is the one representing the high measure of tank number 2. The esti-
mated signal is obtained using the expression xα2 in the equation (3.38), thanks to
that expression only depends on the zα vector the estimated signal xˆ2 is fault-free,
hence xˆ2 substitutes the faulty signal xm2 in the state feedback. Figures 3.25 and
3.26 presents the comparison of final positions with and without reconfiguration.
It is clearly to see that if the signal is not reconfigured the system does not reach
the desired final value.
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Figure 3.25: Reconfiguration after additive fault in x2
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Figure 3.26: Reconfiguration after multiplicative fault in x2
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3.3.3.2 CASE B
FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Using the two available set of flat outputs zα and zβ the number of residues
is duplicated, for this system the number of residuals is increased to 6 (n + n).
The residual signals are computed as in the previous case and are presented in
equation (3.45).

rα1x
rα1u
rα2u
rβ1x
rβ1u
rβ2u


=


xm2
um1
um2
xm1
um1
um2


−


φαx(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [0 1 0]
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [1 0]
T
φαu(zα1, z˙α1, zα2, z˙α2) [0 1]
T
φβx(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) [1 0 0]
T
φβu(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) [1 0]
T
φβu(zβ1, z˙β1, zβ2, z˙β2) [0 1]
T


(3.45)
The fact of increasing the number of residual signals help to improve the FDI
stage. Let us present the framework of each fault. Actuator fault u1 is as in the
case A detected and isolated by simply comparing the residuals amplitude versus
the threshold, see Figs. 3.27 and 3.29. Once again u2 fault present one residue
which depends of the um2 but this one does not exceed the threshold, however
this time thanks to the second vector zβ an additional residue rβ2u is present, such
vector exceeds the threshold, this behavior provide an individual fault signature
for u2 fault, see Table 3.5 and Figs. 3.28 and 3.30.
For sensor faults, for instance a fault affecting high measure of tank one
will affect the three residues in the upper part of the right side in the equation
(3.45) because for this residual signals x1 is a flat output. Besides the residual
signal rβ1x depends on the measure xm1, by consequence it will be affected too.
see Figs. 3.31 and 3.32. Residual signal rβ2u is affected because the pump number
two reacts to the fault as a reflect of the pump to counteract the fault, however the
amplitude is not enough to exceed the threshold.
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Figure 3.27: Additive fault in flow pump u1 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.28: Additive fault in flow pump u2 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.29: Multiplicative fault in flow pump u1 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.30: Multiplicative fault in flow pump u2 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Fault rα1x rα1u rα2u r
β
1x r
β
1u r
β
2u
Fx1 1 1 1 1 1 05
Fx2 1 05 1 1 1 1
Fx3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fu1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Fu2 0 0 05 0 0 1
Table 3.5: Residues matrix Three tank Case B
5This residue is affected but the amplitude is not enough to exceed the threshold.
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Figure 3.31: Additive fault measure x1 normalized (zα and zβ set)
If the fault affects the high measure of tank number two xm2 the affected
residues depend on the zβ vector, by consequence the residues rβ1x, rβ1u and rβ2u
are affected, the residual rα1x is affected too because the presence of xm2. This
time the residual signal affected as consequence of the closed loop is rα1u. See
Figs. 3.33 and 3.34.
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Figure 3.32: Multiplicative fault measure x1 normalized (zα and zβ set)
Fault in xm3 is an special case, because the state x3 is part of both flat
output vectors, by consequence the six residues will be affected. However this is
the only framework in which every residue change its behavior, so, the fault can
be detected and isolated. See Figs. 3.35 and 3.36. Table 3.5 resumes the different
fault signatures.
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Figure 3.33: Additive fault measure x2 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.34: Multiplicative fault measure x2 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.35: Additive fault measure x3 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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Figure 3.36: Multiplicative fault measure x3 normalized (zα and zβ set)
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CONTROL RECONFIGURATION
As a direct consequence of obtaining a second set of flat outputs, not only
the number of residual signals is increased, the number of redundant signals is
augmented as well. This time the equation (2.38) becomes (2)*(3-2)=2, since the
system has 3 states, full reconfiguration is not possible. Observing in detail the
results of the FDI stage and the flat output vectors it is straightforward to see that
the state x3 triggers all the residual signals because it is part of both flat output
vectors. By consequence it is impossible to compute a redundant fault-free version
of it. Such effect prevents the reconfiguration after a fault on x3. This fault is not
considered.
The two redundant signals available to accomplish the FTC approach are as
in case A, the state x2, the additionally set of flat outputs zβ provides a fault-free
version of x1. The reconfiguration is obtained in the same manner that the case A.
Figs. 3.37 and 3.38 depicts the trajectories of the outputs with and without recon-
figuration. Once again it exists a remarkable difference between the trajectories
with and without reconfiguration. Such results proof the efficiency of the proposed
approach.
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Figure 3.37: Reconfiguration after additive fault in x1
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Figure 3.38: Reconfiguration after multiplicative fault in x1
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3.4 CONCLUSION
The proposed approach presented in chapter 2 is tested in this chapter. Two
different systems were selected, a UAV quadrotor and a three tank system. For
the quadrotor only one set of flat outputs is found, however control reconfiguration
can be done partially. For the three tank process two sets fulfilling the conditions
to exploit at maximum the technique are found, this has as consequence the fact
that any fault may be detected and isolated. Fault detection and isolation is carried
out by simply comparing the residual amplitude and a pre-defined fix threshold.
For this specific system, even if in one fault case one of the residues is affected
but does not exceed the threshold, every single fault can be detected and isolated.
This problem can be avoided by changing threshold-based isolation mechanism
for a more adequate one [?].
Control reconfiguration is carried out by simply switching between the fault
and the unfaulty measure, since our approach uses the non-uniqueness property
of the flat vector. Unfaulty signals to reconfigure all the fault measures can only
be obtained if every element of the flat output vectors is differentially coupled and
algebraically independent, and if the flat outputs are the state of the system or a
linear combination of them.
Additionally, for additive faults the amplitude can be estimated by simply sub-
tracting the faulty version from the fault-free one. This information could be useful
in the future, in order to plan an optimal trajectory after failure.
FINAL CONCLUSION
In this thesis, a flatness-based FTC approach is presented, such approach
could be applied to nonlinear and linear systems, such systems has to be differ-
entially flat, this property permits to write every system state and every control
input as function of some internal variables, so-called flat outputs. The FTC ap-
proach take advantage of the non-uniqueness property of the flat output vector, in
fact if there exists at least two set of flat outputs and at least one of their internal
elements are algerbarically independents, the FDI could be improved in a consid-
erable manner. This operation is enhanced because if the supposition presented
before is verified the number of residual signals is augmented, by consequence
the probabilities to obtain a different fault signature for each fault augments too.
Real applicability is verified in two different nonlinear systems, a quadrotor
UAV, for this system only one set of flat outputs could be found, however thanks
that the internal decoupling present in this system each single sensor fault could
be detected and isolated. Additionally thanks that the properties of the flat sys-
tems, fault-free references of the system states are available. Such signals are
used to change the controller reference. This action hide the fault to the controller,
and by consequence the system is not impacted by the fault.
The second system is a classical three tank process, contrarily to the UAV,
this time two set of flat outputs are found. As consequence the number of residues
is augmented and every single fault could be detected. Additionally the fault-free
references could be used for reconfiguration.
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The derivatives needed to compute the unfaulty references are computed
with high-gain observers coupled with a low pass filter in both systems. Howev-
er the internal parameters of each block are tuned according to the system, for
instance the delay introduced for the low-pass filter is not a key parameter in the
three tank process, because the dynamic of this system is slow. By consequence
the filter is designed to eliminate noise and does not take into account the result-
ing time delay. On the other hand the dynamic of the UAV is faster, so the design
of the filter needs special attention, in fact if the cut-off frequency is big the time
delay induced to the estimates will be considerable, however if the cut-off frequen-
cy is low the time delay will decrease but the noise will increase. As consequence
a trade-off needs to be found.
Even if the technique shows to be effective to counteract the fault effect
for both systems, the proposed approach has some limitations. The fact that the
flat outputs has to be system states or linear combination of them could reduce
the applicability. Another important point is the fact that because the technique
is based in Flatness it becomes necessary to compute the time derivatives of
noisy signals, which could be mount in difficulty when the time derivatives mount
in order.
FUTURE WORK
The chapter number three summarized the results presented in this disser-
tation. The proposed FTC technique and their applications to improve the fault
detection and reconfiguration of nonlinear systems were described. Besides the
admired features of the proposed methods, there is a room for further improve-
ments. In below, we outline a few possible directions for possible extension of the
work.
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Obtaining two set of flat outputs could be a hard task. A future direction of
this work could consist in develop an automatic algorithm to do this compu-
tations or at least present the necessary conditions, in which it exists two or
more sets of flat outputs.
The FDI decision is taken by a simply fixed algorithm, even if technique is
effective, in the next work a more sophisticated decision algorithm could be
tested.
Reconfiguration is carried by changing the faulty signal for an estimated
reference. This change is carried out by means of a switch, such action could
produce instability. Future work will be pointed to study this phenomenon
and give solutions to avoid stability.
Another pending issue is related to the real application to both nonlinear
systems. Additionally for the UAV most of the dynamics are neglected, in
order to apply the proposed approach to a real UAV the nonlinear model
presented in this manuscript could be change for a more accurate one.
Reconfiguration shows its applicability to the UAV, however there is some
limitations regarding the fault size, another interesting work could be inves-
tigate the restructuring of the control loop.
ABBREVIATIONS AND NOTATIONS
Abbreviations
Abbreviation Meaning
AFTCS Active Fault Tolerant Control Systems.
DOF Degrees Of Freedom.
EKF Extended Kalman Filter.
ELS Extended Least Squares.
FDI Fault Detection and Isolation.
HOT High Order Terms.
LQ Linear Quadratic.
LS Least Squares.
MPC Model Predictive Control.
NIO Nonlinear Identity Observer.
PID Proportional Integral Derivative.
RLS Recursive Least Squares.
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
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APPENDIX A
TRAJECTORY GENERATION BY
POLYNOMIAL APPROACH
This appendix recalls the construcion of trajectories, by using the polynomial
approach. More advanced approaches, can be found in [libro trajectorias].
Let us define the initial and final conditions fini and ffin, the trajectory gen-
eration problem consists in create a function f(t) which fulfills those constraints.
This is a boundary condition problem, that can be easily solved by consider-
ing polynomial functions such as:
f(t) = a0 + a1t+ a2t
2 + a3t
3 + ... + ant
n (A.1)
Where ai when i = 1, 2...n are polynomial coefficients, and t is the time.
The degree n of the polynomial depends on the number of boundary condi-
tions that must be verified and on the desired “smoothness” of the trajectory. This
degree has to be at least equals to the number of constraints, minus one.
Mathematically, these conditions may be expressed in matrix form as:
M ∗ a = b (A.2)
Where M is a known (n+1)∗(n+1) matrix, composed by time part of the equation
A.1, b is the vector containing the known constraints. a contains the unknown
coefficients.
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The value of the coefficients can be easily computed by using the next ex-
pression
a =M−1b (A.3)
APPENDIX B
SMITH NORMAL FORM
This appendix is intended to present the definition of the Smith normal form,
and give a recursive algorithm to obtain it. The Smith decomposition REF in a
useful tool in mathematics which is specially helpful when working with principal
ideal domain. Which is in fact used in many areas related to mathematics and
engineering.
The unimodular 1 matrices of the principal ideal domain are invertible 2. Be-
sides each matrix M defined over the principal ideal domain admits a diagonal
decomposition, known as Smith decomposition.
Let us define a principal ideal domain A, a polynomial matrix M ∈Mn,m(A),
it exists matrices V ∈ Un(A) and U ∈ Um(A), where Un(A) and Um(A) denotes the
group of unimodular matrices of size n ∗ n and m ∗m over A. Such as
VMU =


(∆ 0n,m−n) if n < m
 ∆
0n−m,m

 if n > m (B.1)
1A square matrix which its determinant is equal to +1 or -1.
2A square matrix A is called invertible if there exists an n-by-n matrix B such that AB = BA = In
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The right part of the equation B.1 is known as the Smith form of M, where
∆ = diag{δ1, ..., δσ, 0, ..., 0} is a diagonal matrix of size n ∗ n (resp. m ∗m), where
the elements (δ1, ...δσ) are such that δi is a non-null polynomial for i = 1, ...σ and it
is a divider of σj for every σ ≥ j ≥ i.
Where V is a product of elementary row matrices, and U is a product of
elementary column matrices.
Example B.1 Compute the Smith decomposition of B.23
M =

1 + x2 x
x 1 + x

 (B.2)
In order to compute the Smith decomposition of B.2, it is necessary to realize
the operations in rows and columns as follows:
Work Work
on rows on columns
⇓ ⇓
1 0 1 + x2 x 1 0
0 1 x 1 + x 0 1
R1 → R1 − (x ∗R2) =⇒ 1 −x 1 −x2 1 0
0 1 x 1 + x 0 1
C2 → C2− (x2 ∗ C1) =⇒ 1 −x 1 0 1 x2
0 1 x 1 + x+ x3 0 1
R2 → R2 − (x ∗R1) =⇒ 1 −x 1 0 1 x2
−x 1 + x2 0 1 + x+ x3 0 1
⇑ ⇑ ⇑
V M U
3Example borrowed from www.numbertheory.org
APPENDIX C
2-NORM
The 2-Norm of a matrix A is defined as:
‖A‖2 =
√
λmax (C.1)
Where λmax is the largest eigenvalue such that A∗A− λI1 is singular2.
When A is not singular the 2-Norm is defined as follows:
‖A−1‖2 = 1√
λmin
(C.2)
Where λmin is the smallest eigenvalue such that A∗A− λI is singular.
1A∗ is the conjugate transpose of A
2A matrix A is called singular if its determinant is zero, A singular matrix is not invertible
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